THE ARYAN PATH

VOLUME XLI - NO. 5

May 1970

EDITORIAL REPRINT from J. D. BERESFORD
Determinism and Free Will

S. L. N. SHRIVASTAVA
Buddha: The Awakener to Highest Enlightenment

MARJORIE SYKES
Gurdial Mallik

ALUN LLEWELLYN
The Bruts

P. NAGARAJA RAO
The Concept of *Moksha*

BOOKS REVIEWED INCLUDE

Individual Morality; *The Bhagavad-Gita* trs. by Juan Mascaró; *The Religion of Tibet: The Message of the Tibetans*; *Contemporary Philosophy in Australia*; *Religion in Africa*; *Christians and the Church in the German Democratic Republic*; *Socio-Economic Change and the Religious Factor in India*; *Freedom and Authority in Education*

complete CONTENTS within

Point out the 'Way'
—however dimly and lost among the host—
as does the Evening Star
to those who tread their path in darkness.

Editor:
SOPHIA WADIA

RECENT EDITIONS OF

THEOSOPHICAL BOOKS

		Rs.	U.S.$	s.d.
Bhagavad-Gita	by W. Q. JUDGE	2·50	0·90	4/3
A rendering from the Sanskrit				
Notes on the Bhagavad-Gita	by W. Q. JUDGE completed by ROBERT CROSBIE	3·25	1.25	5/-
Yoga Aphorisms of Patanjali	by W. Q. JUDGE	2.00	0·75	4/-
An interpretation—by translation and commentary				
The Dhammapada		2.00	0·75	4/-
The Cunningham Press translation of the Buddhist classic				
Universal Theosophy	by ROBERT CROSBIE	3·00	1·00	4/6
His Theosophical talks and lectures on religion, philosophy, ethics, and spiritual life				
Selections from the Upanishads and *The Tao Te King*	Trs. respectively by CHARLES JOHNSTON and LIONEL GILES	2·25	0·80	4/3
The Ocean of Theosophy	by W. Q. JUDGE	2·75	1·00	4/6
A clear and comprehensive summary of Theosophical teachings				
A Book of Quotations	from W. Q. JUDGE	6·25	2·25	9/6
A Book of Quotations	from ROBERT CROSBIE	6·25	2·25	9/6
Companion volumes of quotations, arranged for daily reading and printed for presentation				

PUBLISHERS: Theosophy Company (India) Private Ltd.
Theosophy Hall, 40 New Marine Lines, Bombay 20.BR

THE ARYAN PATH

Editor: SOPHIA WADIA
Assistant Editor: Rameshchandra Sirkar

CONTRIBUTIONS

The Editor is responsible for unsigned contributions only and is not necessarily in agreement with the views of the contributors, to whom free expression of opinion is given

SUBSCRIPTIONS

THE ARYAN PATH is published every month except June and July. Subscriptions are accepted for calendar years or periods covering ten issues. Orders, accompanied by the appropriate remittance, should be sent to the Editorial and Business Office, Bombay, or the London Office

BOOK BORROWING PRIVILEGES

Subscribers in India may borrow, from the "Aryan Path" section of the United Lodge of Theosophists Library, Bombay, books reviewed in THE ARYAN PATH, paying only registered book-post charges if books are required by post

RATES

	Single Copy	Annual Subscription
INDIA	Re. 1.50	Rs. 12.00
EUROPE	2*s.*	18*s.* (or equivalent)
THE AMERICAS	60 cents	$5.00 (or equivalent)

OFFICES

EDITORIAL & BUSINESS OFFICE	Theosophy Hall, 40 New Marine Lines Bombay 20 (BR)
LONDON OFFICE	62 Queen's Gardens, London w.2

Available in the U.S.A. from
Eastern News Distributors
155 West 15th Street, New York, N.Y. 10011, U.S.A.

THE ARYAN PATH: VOL. XLI · NO. 5

May 1970

J. D. BERESFORD — Determinism and Free Will — 201

S. N. L. SHRIVASTAVA — Buddha: The Awakener to Highest Enlightenment — 207

AUDREY S. LA ROCHE — Mystery (Poem) — 210

MARJORIE SYKES — Gurdial Mallik — 211

DANIEL SIMPKINS — *Nunc Dimittis* (Poem) — 213

BRIAN G. COOPER — "One for Renewal" — 214

ALUN LLEWELLYN — The Bruts — 216

N. A. NIKAM — The Philosophy of Indian Culture: A Metaphysic of the Idea of History: II — 221

FRANCIS H. ANGOLD — The Correlation of Opposites as Symbolic of Eternal Values — 227

P. NAGARAJA RAO — The Concept of *Mokṣa* — 233

NEW BOOKS AND OLD

MARJORIE SYKES — Ethics for Today — 237

and reviews by

JOAN N. BURNETT, B. V. NARAYANA REDDY, D. S. MAXTED, H. G. NARAHARI, M. KAYE, ALFRED PARKER, BRIAN G. COOPER, SUMA CHITNIS, SYLVA NORMAN, AND K. KRISHNAMOORTHY — 238

ENDS AND SAYINGS — 246

THE ARYAN PATH

Point out the "Way" — however dimly, and
lost among the host — as does the evening star
to those who tread their path in darkness.

— *The Voice of the Silence*

VOL. XLI MAY 1970 No. 5

J. D. BERESFORD

Determinism and Free Will

[We reprint this article from THE ARYAN PATH, August 1932. The late J. D. Beresford, well-known English novelist, was a valued contributor to our pages for many years. Readers will remember a previous reprint: "A Statement of Belief" in our issue for February 1969.—ED.]

IN the course of the few thousand years of which we have fairly exact historical knowledge, man's subjection to a belief in Fate as a determining influence on individual life has played a curious and interesting part. The belief entered very early into religion. Primitive man if we can judge him by the contemporary savage had sometimes a destructive faith in his own impotence before the retributive powers of the gods he had invented. To break a strict taboo was to incur penalties that he could not in some cases avert by any propitiation of the powers he had offended; and his beliefs were often deep enough to kill him by auto-suggestion, re-inforced by the warnings of witch-doctors and his own terrors.

The Greek Nemesis was no doubt partly a racial development of these early superstitions, but the conception was later rationalized and developed by the brilliant philosophical thought of the period. Originally allied to Artemis and a comparatively unimportant member of the Greek mythology, Nemesis came to be regarded as personifying the guardian of the law, and hence to be associated with the individual conscience. Later, however, we find her represented by Herodotus in the guise of an impersonal figure of destiny administering rewards and punishment to nations and individuals on principles that accord very nearly with those of the laws of Karma.

After the fall of Greece and Rome, however, darkness settled upon Europe and when we come to the revival of learning we find belief in

destiny taking strange and perverted shapes. In the sixteenth century for example, when the avenging *hate* of earlier beliefs had been crystallized into the conception of a single omnipotent, omniscient, omnipresent god, the ideas of predestination or pre-ordination were hung as a perpetual threat over the human mind. The perversion in this creed of Calvin's is due to the oblivion of those aspects of the Greek Nemesis which gave it a true ethical value. The doctrine of Predestination assumes that every human being is born in sin and condemned, *ipso facto*, to Eternal Punishment, unless he shall find "grace" by adopting certain sectarian beliefs, the essential attitudes required being those of repentance and submission, the latter to the tenets of the particular faith involved. In the development of Predestination, the precise nature of the submission and the manner of conversion presented various phases, some of which are still extant. But those who are interested will find the typical absurdity admirably described in Principal L. P. Jacks's sketch "A Psychologist among the Saints."[1]

An aspect of this general fate-threat made by the tribal god still survives in all forms of the Christian religion. The great taboo remains, but altered in form so that the eating of the forbidden fruit appears now as the falling away from the "true faith" in whatever particular version it may be presented by the sect in question, with the emphasis laid on the positive act of submission as the "sole means of grace." The threat, however, remains the same: eternal damnation no matter what may have been the individual's moral and spiritual life. "Unless ye thus believe in the Trinity, ye cannot be saved," says the Athanasian creed of the English Church; and the Roman Church, though it may offer Purgatory for the alleviation of its own sinners, holds out no hope to those who die in another faith.

We come to a more intelligent and intelligible version of the belief in Fate in the old philosophical dispute between Determinism and Free-will; and we may quote our definition of the former as being:

> ... that every action is causally connected not only externally with the agent's environment, but also internally with his motives and impulses. In other words, if we could know exactly all these conditions, we should be able to forecast with mathematical certainty the course which the agent would pursue. On this theory the agent cannot be held responsible in any sense.

The form taken by this contention displays the influence of science. We have substituted for the tribal god an inexorable process. All question of rewards and punishment has disappeared, and man is presented

[1] Included in *Among the Idolmakers* by L. P. JACKS (Williams and Norgate, 1911)

as no more than a by-product of evolution — an interesting phenomenon but probably ephemeral. This, perhaps the most pessimistic and deadening of all beliefs, reached its maximum influence in the nineties of the last century, a time when materialism had its strongest hold on thinking minds in England. Since then its decline although slow has been sufficiently well-marked to indicate the general trend of opinion. And, strangely enough, it has been the steady advance in the science of mathematical physics and the comparative stagnation of that of biology which has been responsible for a sudden quickening in the process during the last ten years.

In fact these brief notes on the changing aspects of an over-ruling Fate, have their origin in Sir Arthur Eddington's presidential address to the Mathematical Association, reprinted as a Supplement to *Nature* in its issue of 13 February 1932. The subject of the address was "The Decline of Determinism," and Sir Arthur, having quoted definitions from Laplace and C. D. Broad, settled finally upon a third given by Fitzgerald in his translation of Omar Khayyam!

> With Earth's first Clay they did the last man knead,
> And there of the Last Harvest sow'd the Seed:
> And the first Morning of Creation wrote
> What the Last Dawn of Reckoning shall read.[2]

Now the reason why this recent pronouncement of Science should have a peculiar significance for readers of THE ARYAN PATH is that, as we shall presently see, Sir Arthur Eddington's exposition of the modern scientific attitude in this regard is one that will comfortably accommodate the doctrine of Karma, which for Theosophists takes the place of the Greek Nemesis,[3] and resolves the vexed problems of Fate and Retribution. For, as I have urged before in these pages, modern Science working along its own path is now continually stumbling upon the truths of the Inner Wisdom, throwing here and there little gleams of light into minds that cannot be reached by other means.

Sir Arthur's main argument opens with a division of physical phenomena into two classes, one that we regard as impossible, the other as highly improbable, and proceeds to show that we may safely prophesy that causes in the mass will produce certain results when "the predictions and regularities refer to average behaviour of the vast number of

---

[2] It is an interesting commentary on the general subject to note that this, in effect a summary of Omar's philosophy, should have been written early in the twelfth century. As an aspect of fatalism it may be put beside the Turkish proverb: "What God has written upon your forehead, *that* will happen."

[3] Cp. *The Secret Doctrine*, I. 642

particles concerned in most of our observations"; but that when "we deal with fewer particles the indeterminacy begins to become appreciable ... until finally the behaviour of a single atom or electron has a very large measure of indeterminacy."

Finally, to complete as nearly as may be the analogy we are seeking, Sir Arthur says, still speaking of the electron:

> Actually we can have contemporaneous knowledge of the values of half the symbols, but never more than half ... Instead of two paired symbols, one wholly known and the other wholly unknown, we can take two symbols each of which is known with some uncertainty; then the rule is that the product of the two uncertainties is fixed. Any interaction which reduces the uncertainty of determination of one increases the uncertainty of the other ... We divide the uncertainty how we like but we cannot get rid of it.

The lecture closes with the words:

> These revolutions of scientific thought are clearing up the deeper contradictions between life and theoretical knowledge, and the latest phase with its release from determinism marks a great step onwards. I will even venture to say that in the present theory of the physical universe we have at last reached something which a reasonable man might almost believe.[!]

We might go somewhat further than this in adding that scientific thought is slowly making its way towards a physical explanation of the universe which is implicit, however different the statement, in the ancient Wisdom-Religion; and that, whatever the method of enquiry, if the search is pressed far enough, diligently and sincerely, all problems of life and matter will ultimately find a single solution. But for the moment our purpose is solely concerned with this question of free will, and before going further it will be as well to make a brief summary of the three aspects in which it has been here presented.

The first from the point of view of what may be described as "primitive religion," beginning with the earliest beliefs of the savage and reaching the stage at which Christianity, for example, has now arrived. In this development the dim realization of determining law is always anthropomorphic and takes the figure of some superhuman being, earth-god, tribal god, world-god, each succeeding figure approaching more nearly to the ideal of omnipotence, and omniscience. But with these last ascriptions, the rationality of the figure begins to fail, since if God is all-powerful and all-knowing, his creation, man, becomes a mere puppet whose ultimate destiny must be foreseen by his creator and who is therefore bereft of all but the absurdest semblance of free will. For

there can be no logical escape from the deduction that if God knows the end, then that end is predetermined.

The second point of view is that of philosophy, of which all that need be said here is that after "great argument about it and about," we came out "by the same door" through which we entered — inevitable consequence of the fact that the disputants to whom we listened were each and all arguing to prove a predetermined assumption.

Finally we find this new-born science, product of three centuries of applied learning and experiment, whose exponents have adopted the postulate that any result however unexpected and confounding must be accepted if it is sufficiently justified — passing through a stage of strict determinism to emerge in the form indicated by the quotations given above.

Now what we find in common among these various aspects is a recognition of some over-ruling law, coupled with an inability to state it. The belief in Fate, of which even the most primitive man has an intuitive awareness, has led humanity to the wildest and most fantastic of deductions. The belief in the law of cause and effect influenced the scientists of yesterday to affirm that it was invariable and could not, in any circumstances, be affected by the human will. But in spite of superstition and science, an inner conviction not less than common sense continues to fight a winning battle in defence of free will.

And, as we so often find, the truth lies between the two extremes. Sir Arthur Eddington states the case for the physicist by saying that when we consider a collection of atoms the law of cause and effect holds, giving us the power of accurate prediction in the physical world; but that, when we come to the contemplation of the ultimate unit, we are faced by the conclusion that it has a certain latitude within its own ambit. Let us compare that conclusion with what we know of the great law of Karma.

To begin with we may note that men and "angels" are "the slaves and creatures of immutable Karmic and Kosmic law,"[4] and that "those who believe in Karma have to believe in *destiny*."[5] But this law, on the scientific analogy, is that which prevails when we regard matter or humanity in the mass. Let us now consider that individual who corresponds to the electron. "Man," writes Madame Blavatsky, "is a free agent during his stay on earth. He cannot escape his *ruling* Destiny, but he has the choice of two paths that lead him in that direction."[6] Thus we see that Sir Arthur Eddington's analogy draws a little closer. Our electron, about

---

[4] *The Secret Doctrine*, I. 276

[5] *Loc. cit.*, I. 639

[6] *Loc. cit.*, I. 639

which he can posit one certainty only at the expense of increasing our uncertainty regarding it in another direction, appears within the limits imposed to have a choice of alternatives, but no escape from the "*ruling* Destiny."

Nevertheless if we carry the matter one step further we see that the law is ultimately one of our own making. Karma, in effect, is self-induced, an inevitable result of certain first causes, and one that must obtain until its purpose is satisfied. But

> were no man to hurt his brother, Karma-Nemesis would have neither cause to work for, nor weapons to act through. It is the constant presence in our midst of every element of strife and opposition ... that is the chief cause of the "ways of Providence" ... Karma-Nemesis is no more than the (spiritual) dynamical effect of causes produced and forces awakened into activity by our own actions.[7]

Here, then, we have the heart of the whole matter. We see free will determined by its own exercise and invalidating itself by wrong use. We have the power of choice but it will be progressively delimited if we choose wrongly. Thus Free Will and Determinism co-exist and react one upon the other — even as in the happy analogy Sir Arthur Eddington has provided by his instance of the electron in which "any interaction which reduces the uncertainty of determination of one increases the uncertainty of the other." For our wrong choice in previous incarnations tends always to circumscribe the exercise of free will in the incarnation that follows.[8]

Yet at the end we may believe that "good will be the final goal of ill," and the law of Karma-Nemesis be resolved.

J. D. BERESFORD

> And yet, my friend, I would rather that the whole world should be at odds with me, and oppose me, than that I myself should be at odds with myself, and contradict myself.
>
> —PLATO

---

[7] *Loc. cit.*, I. 643-4

[8] An interesting example may be found in "Karmic Visions" by "Saujna" (H. P. Blavatsky), originally printed in *Lucifer* in June 1888.

S. N. L. SHRIVASTAVA

Buddha: The Awakener to Highest Enlightenment

[Dr. S. N. L. Shrivastava, M.A., D.LITT., is an old and esteemed friend who has contributed many thoughtful articles to our pages, especially on philosophical topics. In this brief but deeply felt essay he speaks of the real mission of the Buddha in terms of texts and incidents drawn directly from Buddhist literature. As Dr. Shrivastava sees it, the Buddha sought to point out the Way, leaving each pilgrim to adopt the best means he was capable of towards the highest enlightenment.—ED.]

SAID the Lord Buddha:

Appakāte manussesu ye janā pāragāmino
Athā'yam itarā pajā tiramevānudhāvati.

"Few are they amongst men who desire to cross over (the river of empirical existence) and reach the Other (transcendental) Shore."

—*Dhammapada*, verse 85

To the same tune, Shri-Krishna the Ancient Teacher said: "*manuṣyāṇām sahasreṣu kaścid yatati siddhaye*" — "Rarely one in thousands strives for Perfection" (*Gītā*, VII.3).

In a telling manner, the stern teacher of the *Kaṭhopaniṣad* tells us: "*na sāmparāyaḥ pratibhāti bālam*" — "The Beyond does not come within the ken of those of puerile understanding."

Indeed, those who bring to us "authentic tidings of invisible things" are few and far between.

We are beside ourselves with joy when our astronauts land on the moon and bring to us knowledge of the interstellar universe. Indeed every advancement in the knowledge of the universe we live in should be a matter of rejoicing to us. But there is a big question before the troubled humanity of today: Will all this knowledge be conducive to the promotion of human fraternity, peace, and happiness?

The answer need not be expressed in so many words. Scientific and technological advance of humanity has not raised its ethical level. A wise thinker has aptly remarked that ours is an age of nuclear giants and ethical infants. The knowledge which raises man to his highest ethico-spiritual stature is of a different order. Our Upaniṣadic sages drew a very significant distinction between *aparā vidyā* and *parā vidyā*. All the varied sciences and branches of knowledge which pertain to this universe of our empirical experience constitute *aparā vidyā*; the knowledge by which the Immortal and the Transcendental is comprehended is the *parā vidyā*, the *prajñā-pāramitā* in Buddhistic terminology.

The great spiritual teachers of humanity, Krishna, Christ, Buddha,

and others, came to awaken humanity to an awareness of That which is beyond all limits of the empirical — the Ātman of the Upaniṣads, the Nirvāṇa of the Buddha, the Śunyam of Nagarjuna, the Nameless Tao of Lao-tze. So deep and unutterable is the Truth to which they wanted to awaken humanity that Lao-tze was divinely right in saying about it:

He who knows, speaks not,
He who speaks, knows not.

Gautama the Buddha was a seer of this unutterable Truth. For full three weeks he remained immersed in the enjoyment of the Vision Splendid and what he realized appeared to him so subtle that he thought it futile to speak about it to anybody. But Brahmā, it is said, appeared before him and with folded hands entreated him to preach the truth he had realized for the welfare of humanity, and Buddha then resolved to do so. He was always conscious of the fact that the highest truth he had realized was beyond the comprehension of ordinary minds. He would speak about it to the select few, to those who had a high degree of spiritual sensitivity.

We read in the *Saddharma-Puṇḍarīka* that once five thousand monks and nuns and lay devotees of both sexes had gathered at a congregation to hear from Buddha about the highest Buddha-knowledge. In spite of their repeated entreaties, the Buddha would not speak out. At last the entire congregation melted away and only Sariputra was left. The Buddha, recognizing Sariputra as a worthy recipient of his highest teaching, said: "My congregation is now pure, freed from chaff; the trash is removed and the pith only remains."[1]

The Buddha always adjusted his teachings to the level of the audience he had to face. Said the Buddha to Sariputra: "I reveal the law in its multifariousness with regard to the inclinations and dispositions of creatures. I use different means to rouse each according to his own character. Such is the might of my knowledge." (*SDP*, p. 54)

"*Ekam sad viprā bahudhā vadanti*" — the One Truth is spoken of variously by the wise — said the seer of the *Ṛgveda*. The idea is echoed in Buddha's words:

> As a vessel is made to receive all its distinguishing qualities according to the quality of the substance laid into it, so the Tathagatas, on account of the diversity of taste, mention a diversity of vehicles, though the Buddha-vehicle be the only indisputable one. (*SDP*, p. 136)

The Buddha is regarded as the founder of a religion, a new religion

---

[1] *Saddharma-Puṇḍarīka* (in the S.B.E. series, published by Motilal Banarsidass, hereinafter to be referred to as *SDP*), p. 44

which has come to be known as Buddhism. In fact, Buddha never intended to found a religion in the institutionalized sense of the word. He called his religion a Way (*magga*; Sanskrit, *Mārga*). This Way he never regarded as *his* Way, or a Way *invented* by him. To him it was a Way taught by all the Buddhas that came before him and a Way that will be taught by all the Buddhas that will follow him in times to come. The different Buddhas in different epochs of time cannot possibly teach different vehicles, he said, for there is but one vehicle to Buddhahood. The following words uttered by him to Sariputra are significant:

> "The former Tathagatas also, living in the past for innumerable Æons, the many thousands of Buddhas who are gone to final rest, whose number can never be counted,
>
> Those highest of men have all of them revealed most holy laws by means of illustrations, reasons and arguments, with many hundred proofs and skilfulness. And all of them have manifested but one vehicle and introduced but one on earth; by one vehicle have they led to full ripeness inconceivably many thousands of *kotis* of beings." (*SDP*, p. 49)

Buddha never claimed to have *founded* anything but simply to have *found out* what the Buddhas of the ages past had found out and what Buddhas in the ages to come shall be finding out.

Buddhism, if the word be taken to mean only the essential core of what the Buddha himself had taught, is no creed, no institutionalized religion, but the Way eternal and universal trod by the Enlightened of all the ages. The real mission of the Buddha, as he himself has stated it, was not to propound doctrines or to formulate any system of metaphysics or theological dogmatics but to point out the Way to the highest ethico-spiritual stature. Memorable are his words:

> I am the Tathagata, O ye gods and men! the Arhat, the perfectly enlightened one; having reached the shore myself, I carry others to the shore; being free, I make free; being comforted, I comfort; being perfectly at rest, I lead others to rest. By my perfect wisdom, I know both this world and the next, such as they really are. I am all-knowing, all-seeing. Come to me, ye gods and men! hear the law. I am he who indicates the path; who shows the path, as knowing the path, being acquainted with the path. (*SDP*, p. 120)

The Path, the Noble Eightfold Path (*ariyam atthāngikam maggam*), is the quintessential core of Buddha's teachings. The whole emphasis of the Buddha was on perfection in this Path, elevating man to the highest spiritual stature he is capable of, to Buddhahood, the Highest Enlightenment.

To preach nothing short of the Highest Enlightenment was the lofty mission of the Buddha. To quote his own words:

> The Chief of the world appears in the world to reveal the Buddha-knowledge. He has but one aim, indeed, no second; the Buddhas do not bring over (creatures) by an inferior vehicle ... I would be guilty of envy, should I, after reaching the spotless eminent state of enlightenment, establish anyone in the inferior vehicle. That would not beseem me. (*SDP*, pp. 46-47)

The demented humanity of today, fanning more and more the fires of violence and hatred, howsoever boastful it may be of its scientific and technological achievements, will be saved, not by creeds and theologies or even by new-fangled forms of institutionalized religions, but by taking seriously to heart the gospel of the ethical transformation of life, of human consciousness expanding in the dimensions of Compassion and Love, Fraternity and Friendliness.

Let not the message of the Enlightened One, never more needed than at the present times, go unheeded:

> *na hi verena verāni sammantīdha kudacanam*
> *averena hi sammanti esa dhammo sanantano*

Never does hatred cease by hatred but by love alone; this is the Law Eternal.

—*Dhammapada*, verse 5

S. N. L. SHRIVASTAVA

Mystery

Perched on the point
Of a flashing star
Infinite galaxies
Near and far:

Deaths beyond death
Lives beyond life
Mystery of mysteries
Out of the night.

AUDREY S. LA ROCHE

MARJORIE SYKES

Gurdial Mallik

[The late Shri Gurdial Mallik was a friend of whom it is difficult to speak in measured words. His passing away in the April of this year was a loss to almost uncounted friends and institutions, and literature in several languages. Miss Marjorie Sykes writes of him with the understanding of long friendship and comradeship in many works of service.—ED.]

THE SANTINIKETAN of the late 'thirties, of the closing years of the Poet's life, had much to offer. The community bubbled over with life — an eager, adventurous life of the mind and the spirit, embracing both scholarship and song, seeking and creating beauty, centred on "Golden Bengal" yet drawing into its orbit of friendship and interest the most distant cultures of East and West. For Santiniketan, like Tagore, who inspired it, counted all things human as its own, and brought together in one "family of the human spirit" the artist and the prophet, the sceptic and the saint.

It was in this setting that I first knew Gurdial Mallik. How fully, and as it were inevitably, he had lived himself into its life! That life would begin each day with the sunrise call to common worship, under the *sal* trees in front of the old library; Gurdial would come, daily without fail, and daily without fail accompanied by a little gang of children; he would stand with them in line, eyes closed in natural, un-self-conscious meditation. A little later he might be teaching a circle of students under a tree — though comparatively formal scenes like this are the least memorable of one's memories. Far more vivid are those of Gurdial arriving on one's verandah, with a merry shout or a heart-warming greeting, to claim a cup of tea — for he had entry to every home. But most vivid of all are the memories of Gurdial in the tiny clay cottage which Nanda Lal Bose had built for him in the Kala Bhavan grounds. The art students had painted frescoes on its walls, with words from Tagore which Gurdial himself had chosen:

> Let only that little be left of me
> By which I may name Thee my all.

Here he lived with "that little" of outward possession which was still his — a box, a change of shirt, a few books, a pen. And here people gathered like bees to honey — children to play and feel welcome; adolescents to wrestle with youth's problems alongside one who understood and cared; scholars and artists, teachers and labourers, "all the world and his wife," to talk out their troubles, hopes, and dreams with this man who listened and scarcely spoke but whose very silence had power to comfort, to guide — and to judge.

It is more than thirty years since those good days at Santiniketan, when perhaps Mallikji remained more "stationary" than ever before or since. He loved very deeply Tagore's poem which begins: "Thou art the sky and Thou art the nest as well." Santiniketan was his beloved "nest," but one may perhaps guess that the call of the sky became more insistent as the years went on.

As the years went on, Gurdial found the doors of many homes set wide to welcome the pilgrim on his journeyings. Of material "goods" he sought nothing and kept nothing, but like others who in humility and singleness of heart have sought first the kingdom of God, he found how much more was added, both of the comfort of human love and the burden of human sorrow. To Gurdial the love and the burden were given in full measure. He would not let men call him "*guru*," but he could not willingly be absent from those who were in trouble or in need, and they rejoiced in the warmth and radiance he brought with him. They felt the radiance not only as his, but as something shining through him from an eternal Source of joy and compassion. If, as has been said, a saint is a window open on Eternity, then Gurdial was truly of the company of the saints.

In 1962 some of those Quaker friends from U.S.A. who had known Gurdial in India and felt most deeply the impact of his unique personality persevered against seemingly endless obstacles until way opened for him to visit their country. There he was brought into touch with people of enormously varied religious traditions and outlook, some of them very alien — or so one would think — from the spirit of India. One of the most significant tributes paid to him is that Gurdial's meeting with these men and women "always carried their own religious awareness to a new dimension." Is not that the hallmark of Truth — that its impact should enrich and expand whatever is real in the receiver, that it should fulfil and not destroy?

In India and America alike men revered Gurdial Mallik, but it was not possible for any artificial solemnity to live in his presence. If a transparent radiance is one mark of the saint, playfulness and gaiety is another. Gurdial played magnificently; he clowned, he twinkled, he teased, he brought with him great waves of delighted laughter. Children chuckled, men and women relaxed and rested in his gay serenity.

He has gone beyond our sight, and we record our gratitude for the enriched awareness, and for the comfort and peace, that his gay and radiant spirit has brought into the countless lives which he has touched. There is one more thing that must be said. This man, like all true saints, however humble, has brought us also an inescapable challenge. He chal-

lenges the wretched third-rateness of most of our lives by the quality of his own; he challenges our mean and slothful compromises by the joyful and willingly accepted discipline by which his life became a vehicle of the simplicity of Truth. He disturbs our complacent falsehoods by what was, in T. S. Eliot's words:

> A life of complete simplicity
> Costing not less than everything.

MARJORIE SYKES

Nunc Dimittis

We grow older,
we grow old
until, in time,
we are shoved off the brink —
into a void?
But the outer husk
which for most of our earthly life
has left us so much desensitized
drops off
leaving us free
to soar to a higher level of life.
So now
we find ourselves responsive
to finer frequencies
so that colours and forms
and dimensionalities
are more vivid
and bear an impact
of greater reality.
We have come into our own.
We're home again.

DANIEL SIMPKINS

"One for Renewal"

DIALOGUE between Christianity and other religions, relations between Christian and non-Christian cultures, the availability of Christian premises in Britain for non-Christian worship as and when requested by members of other religious communities, and the need to experiment with inter-faith services were major concerns expressed at the launching of a new all-denominations Christian movement in Britain, "One for Renewal." This movement, which draws support from all branches of Christianity in Britain including Roman Catholicism, was formally launched this year, after two years' activity involving nearly two thousand people. At the inaugural conference, Working Groups set out an agenda for action in the years ahead, under headings which included "Spirituality," "Non-Violence," "Dialogue With Other Religions," "Race" and "World-Poverty."

Some common themes revolved around the realization that the presence in Britain of recently-settled Commonwealth citizens of Hindu, Muslim, Sikh, and other faiths made dialogue and understanding both possible and necessary. The "Dialogue With Other Religions" Group called for "the exploration of common ground, from the basis of mutual respect for each other's beliefs and the desire to understand rather than convert," and rejected as less than meaningful or constructive any "seeking for an all-embracing conformity." The mutual examination of belief could take place not only at the levels of philosophy, theology, and literature, but also in terms of history, social structures, and various other forms of cultural phenomena. In the context of contemporary Britain, the contacts for the promotion of inter-faith dialogue need not be confined to bodies long-established for that purpose: local churches could make direct approaches to immigrant religious communities in their areas, and also work through Community Relations Councils. The Group report stressed the need for "the personal approach at the domestic level" by Christians to non-Christian neighbours as absolutely central to the development of inter-faith understanding and good interracial relations. The Group also issued a call to the Churches to "pressurize mass media, centrally and locally, to give respectful presentation of Sikh, Muslim, and Hindu faiths." It is expected that, under the broad aegis of "One for Renewal," a communications network will be established between groups and individuals in Britain involved in inter-faith dialogue.

The inaugural conference also called for the continuation and widening of the current dialogue between Christians, Marxists, and Humanists.

The Working Group on Spirituality questioned how symbols and images could be found which were spiritually satisfying to secular man, and called for more study of the relationship between the Spirit of God and the growth of secularism in the modern world. The interest, among young people in the West, in meditation and Oriental religions had to be taken seriously by Christian bodies. The willingness of young Western Man to meditate, and to study the scriptures of Hinduism and other Oriental

faiths, was both a commentary on the inadequate spirituality of Western Christianity today and an indication of the paths it ought to explore to re-vitalize itself.

The importance of devising forms of worship expressing the brotherhood of man was emphasized by the Working Group on "Race." It was also urged that inter-faith understanding be a regular part of schools' religious education curricula, and that churches of all denominations in Britain be willing, and make clear their willingness, to make premises available for non-Christians wishing to worship and unable to afford their own buildings. While it might often be the case that Musilms or Hindus would not wish to worship inside a consecrated church, because of its specific Christian associations, it was felt that such worship could be mutually acceptable if held in halls and other premises owned by British religious organizations. In instances where legal obstacles might occur against the use of Christian-owned buildings for worship by those of other faiths, the appropriate steps had to be taken through the processes of law to make it possible.

Altogether, the inaugural conference of "One for Renewal" showed both commendable realism and a truly outgoing concern in seeking to bring the issue of inter-faith dialogue into the centre of contemporary religious discussion in Britain.

Linked with this, was a profound concern to listen to Third World voices, both in terms of the needs of developing countries and from the angle of non-Western Christians contributing to the stream of British religion. The Working Group on World Poverty urged further Christian support for action for world development, putting the renewal of religion in the wider context of "the renewal of the world." Its call was for persistence

> in the search for a theological understanding of Man in God's world of today, whose liberty will release the rich and varied potential of man's responsibility expressed in a renewed spirituality, without which our concern will wither . . .

Unless Christian concerns in Britain were put in the context of "the crisis of humanity," they would become parochial and pointless. This note was re-sounded by a representative of the African Methodist Episcopal Church, the Rev. Mosche Sephula, who spoke of the rising tide of Black Power and its religious parallel, Black Theology, both of which were giving a new self-confidence and self-consciousness to the American, African, and Caribbean Negro communities. Their spirituality, derived from traditional Western missionary Christianity, yet infused with the distinctive religious awareness and experience of black humanaty — "joy and hope amid terrible suffering" — could now enrich Western Christianity, he believed.

BRIAN G. COOPER

ALUN LLEWELLYN

The Bruts

[Mr. Alun Llewellyn is too well known to our readers to need introduction. As in many of his previous contributions, he draws upon a special study of early Welsh books combined with a thoughtful interpretation of scientific concepts in the earliest civilizations. He shows how the memory of these concepts is intertwined with so many of the striking themes of early and medieval European writing.—ED.]

Brut is a word that became accepted as meaning a History shortly after Geoffrey of Monmouth, about 1144, wrote the famous *History of the Kings of Britain,* tracing their ancestry to one Brutus, descendant of the Aeneas who fled from Troy to found the city of Rome. The British King Arthur, whom he largely invented, returned to Rome in due course as its conqueror. The popularity of this romance was enough to establish *Brut* as an alternative for a *History,* and in that sense it is used as an over-all appellation for a collection of Chronicles contained in the *Red Book of Hergest,* a medieval Welsh series of texts dating from the early part of the fourteenth century. The use of the word, however, in this sense seems to have been made by French writers before the Welsh; for Geoffrey was writing in the cause of Henry II, who ruled from Scotland to the Pyrenees and whose imperial ambitions were wider than the British Isles could contain. Writings of a much earlier period, from which Geoffrey drew both his *Arthur* and his *Brut,* use the words as part of the sophisticated study of astronomical features and the expression of a philosophy based upon them. In a curiously involved way, this gives some justification to Geoffrey's underlying theme.

Until the twentieth century, the Urban Revolution, as it is called, dominated the structure of civilization. Before about 4000 B.C., man's social organization had been that of the group devoted either to hunting and fishing, domesticating the herd but still dependent on it, or acquiring knowledge of agriculture and the crafts of weaving and pottery-making. These skills led more to social aggregation than social organization; the men who lived at Catal Huyuk, *c.* 7000 B.C., heaped their dwellings together like a hive, in a hillock of artificial caves. It was not until the mathematics of time and space, derived from effective analysis of the movement of the heavenly bodies, was sufficiently detailed to provide a geometric basis for architecture that the city became possible and human living itself took on the structural shape, commanding the present and projecting the future, which is called civilization.

From its first inception, this expression of the human conceptual

faculty was aware of its own precarious nature. The Intelligence it detected in the framing of the Universe could be only imperfectly reflected in the mind of man. It was the duty of the city to become as close a parallel as possible to the design of the heavens; the Justice evident in their mathematic pattern was responsible for that "unwritten law" which, standing apart from legislation and legality as decided by men, could not, nevertheless, in the famous phrase of Pericles, be broken without shame. The great History of Thucydides is devoted to showing how, after the death of Pericles, the breach of that moral principle by Athens itself brought the inevitable retribution from the gods. The Erinyes, which for Heraclitus were the Tropic confines containing the movement of the Sun and nothing more, for the Greek tragedians became the personification of that Law which must not be broken, even unwittingly.

The mind of Greece was sharply divided between the schools prior to that Spartan War, which believed, as Pythagoras believed, in the inevitability of Justice, and those which came after, in which, like the Cynics, men despaired of society or, like the Cyrenaics, avoided the dangers of human contact. But Plato, who had the opportunity to study the effects of the War, could look even further back for confirmation of his theme that men in practice fell far short of Justice — indeed had no genuine instinct for it by reason of their earthly constitution — to the earlier tradition of Atlantis, an empire of pride destroyed in a single night, together with those who opposed it, by violent cataclysm. It was left to Aristotle, in the era of a new birth for Hellenism under Macedon, to insist that men, through awe and pity induced by poetry at its best, could recover the meaning of Justice.

The precarious nature of civilization, only to be preserved by a social organization conscious of an ethical basis, remained the theme of philosophers and historians. It is a theme usually forgotten until civilization begins to collapse and, even then, has to wait for its acceptance till the despairs and rejections accompanying that collapse have dissolved with society itself. From the last days of Roman civilization, two texts have survived, one (perhaps) from the fourth century A.D., the other (perhaps) from the fifth; the former, the *De Bello Troiano* of Dictys the Cretan, the latter, the *De Excidio Trojae* of Dares the Phrygian. Both were alleged to be eye-witness accounts of the Fall of Troy. Although both Dictys and Dares are named in the *Iliad*, there is little if any doubt that these were productions of the late Roman period; and it is interesting that men's minds should have turned, at that time, to the tale of the destruction of a previous civilization. The tale of Troy is now assigned to a period broadly corresponding to the fall of the brilliant Minoan

culture or that of its Mycenaean successor. The Homeric text seems to have been collated at Athens under Peisistratus and to be based on memories of history already remote. The curious fact that none of its descriptions of surrounding territory corresponds with the accepted site at Hissarlik has been matter for comment. Its general character as being an epic story of the working of the heavens in command of human destiny seems borne out by the metaphor of Achilles having forged for him the emblem of time and space in his fivefold and quartered shield; by the sceptre which Agamemnon received from the hands of the gods; and by the horse, bearing the Hellenes in its womb, by which Ilium fell; for Heraclitus uses the term *Hippoi* to describe the "powers" of Zeus and the famous fable may have originated in the same way that the Erinyes received their female shapes.

Unless the Tale of Troy had had some significance of this kind and been realized to be something more than a chronicle of romantic feuds, it would be difficult to understand why Virgil claimed Troy, through Aeneas, as the source of Rome's succession to greatness, or why, so soon after the fall of western Rome, the seventh-century *Chronicle of Fredegarius* claimed one Francus, descendant also of Priam, king of Troy, as the ancestor of the Frankish people and their leader, Clovis, who termed himself Consul of the Gaul he had seized from Syagrius, last representative of Roman rule.

It was, however, in the twelfth century that the theme was revived, in favour of the Angevin Empire of Henry II of England and Aquitaine. Geoffrey's History launched the Arthurian legend in the romantic form which has since then never left it; and Benoit de Sainte Maire, somewhat later, produced the *Roman de Troie* dedicated to Henry's Queen Eleanor. Benoit bases himself largely on Fredegarius, Dares, and Dictys. Geoffrey imitates Fredegarius in finding the ancestor of the British people in Brutus, scion of Troy; but he takes a number of hints from the earlier Latin chronicle of Gildas. This, probably a contemporary account of the state of Britain prior to the mission of Augustine to convert it to Roman Catholicism, denounces it as the home of a false religion, too much concerned with the study of the stars (in which Gildas sees nothing but astrology) and singles out for special attack one Cuneglassos, who is too much identified with the Ursus (Polar Constellation) and the Auriga, not only referable to a well-known group of stars but used in Latin to mean a Pilot. It is curious to note that Gildas entitles his work *De Excidio Britanniae* as Dares Phrygius had called his *De Excidio Trojae,* perhaps a century earlier.

Whatever "very ancient book" Geoffrey may, or may not, have drawn

upon as his source, as he alleged, the possibility that it may have been some imitation of Fredegarius, furiously over-written by Gildas, can only be conjecture; though the *History of Nennius* is clearly a garbled form of some more reliable text. But that Geoffrey's work was intended to recall the theme of the common origin of European peoples in the lost civilization of the East Mediterranean and to carry with it the idea of their re-unification was apparently assumed by those who came after him. In the collection of "Bruts" in the *Red Book of Hergest,* Geoffrey's History is prefaced by the translation of Dares Phrygius, as it is followed by soberer chronicles of later times, including the tale of Charlemagne and his peers, which the Middle Ages considered the epic story of the revival of a Christian Rome. The translation of Dares dates no earlier than 1300; it is in a definitely Welsh language wherein the grammatical conventions and some of the false assumptions drawn from the much earlier language of the *Taliesin* and its companions are already firmly established. In recounting the exploits of the Argonauts as a preceding chapter in the tale of Troy, it accepts for "Hercules," companion of Jason, the Erculf or Erclwyf by which the *Book of Taliesin* describes the Ocean bounded by Creation beyond this planet. The note is worth making, since the Hercules of the ancients was specifically identified with the point where the Mediterranean is shut in by the Atlantic, whose only further shore was the frontier of the distant stars. And it is relevant to recall that both Hercules, companion of Vega, and Argo Navis, companion of Sirius, not only remain major constellations but mark, by their positions due North and due South at the end of and in the middle of the year, points of major significance for early navigation.

The "Bruts," therefore, were a seried survey of traditional material giving the story of European civilization as a whole, finding a common source in the culture that preceded Greece and, in Arthur in the fifth and sixth centuries and Charlemagne in the ninth, dominant figures in the attempt to recover its cultural unity. Although the specifically Arthurian romance owes its character to Angevin political aims which inspired the work of Geoffrey and Benoit, it not only reflected a long antecedence from the slow disintegration of Rome but was revived in the fifteenth century when the Great Schism divided Church and Empire; and from the political chaos into which Britain had fallen emerged the great work of Malory, the *Morte d'Arthur.*

But this drew on other sources than those in the Bruts. The *Red Book,* in addition to them, contains the Tales of the *Mabinogion,* some a mythopoeic, others a courtly-romantic, recension of the ancient philosophy of the *Taliesin* and its companions. Malory made use of much of

this allegoric material. But it was from another History, parallel in purpose, that he derived what was to become a dominant feature of the Arthurian cycle. The story of the Grail he gathered from a publication appearing in Welsh and in French at about the same time, the opening of the thirteenth century. The guess of Bishop Helinand that the *Graal* (as the French version spells it) was from *Gradalis* (a Cup) has remained firmly fixed in tradition, though he was quite clear in stating that he had no idea as to its actual meaning and had not read the book itself. The Welsh version, claiming to be a transcript from a record written five hundred years earlier (i.e., about A.D. 700) spells the word *Greal*. Both forms of the word fall readily into the vocabulary of the Ancient Books. The *Graal* is the aggregation of the sphere of Sun about the perennially fixed points of its relation to Earth — the Solstices, Equinoxes, Meridian, and Pole. It was seen as the symbol of the divine Intelligence which laid down, for man to discover and implement, the geometrically adjusted divisions of Time and Space on which he has built all his achievements. Peredur (or Perceval), the chief character of the story, is specifically described as being "set in the Turning Circle of the skies," and his quest is the metaphoric account of that Stoic-Christian philosophy in which the four inner stages of Creation and Becoming would finally dissolve into the outer Quintessence of ultimate and eternal Being, whose mystery, as the story insists, could only be resolved by the Christian teaching. The thirteenth century resolved and reconciled the faith of St. Augustine of Hippo in the *City of God* with the moral sense of Boethius in the *Consolations of Philosophy*. And it is scarcely fortuitous that the same century saw the foundation of genuine principles of democracy in those representative constitutions erected in West Europe which, like Magna Carta, made Justice a principle more important than Order, and Equity more important than Law.

The later history of the theme varied from St. Thomas More's *Utopia*, with its dream of a perfect community fostering man's "trewe delights" in art and human fellowship, to the fantasticated fiction of Amadis of Gaul and Huon of Bordeaux.

It is perhaps reserved for the twentieth century not only to rediscover, through archaeology, the truth of civilization, first unity in the East but, through exploration of the solar system, to rediscover the principle of human community through moral intelligence.

ALUN LLEWELLYN

N. A. NIKAM

The Philosophy of Indian Culture
A Metaphysic of the Idea of History

[We print below the second and concluding part of Professor N. A. Nikam's impressive and compact study of the philosophy of history which he finds in Indian cultural tradition.—ED.]

II

12. OVER AND ABOVE the "regress" into a past — into a temporal or timeless past — where "recorded" history recedes into myth, *itihāsa* into *purāṇa,* that which was "ancient" in "ancient" times, which the idea of history involves in the philosophy of Indian culture, there are two other elements, which entail one another in its total conception of the idea of history, which "make" history.

(*a*) Since the idea of history as a "regress" into the past involving memory or recollection is superseded by the idea of the deed — the deed which unites memory of the past with hope for the future — the idea of history is re-defined: i.e., the idea of history involves the idea of "making," and the idea of "making" means that a philosophy of history in Indian culture is a philosophy of action.

(*b*) Since there is no "making" of history without the making of "new" history, the idea of history in Indian culture involves two "events," if we may say so, which make "new" history. One is the *ascent* of Man, and the other is the *descent* of the Divine: the ascent concerns the individual and the descent concerns cosmic order.

13. (*a*) Hegel said in his *Philosophy of History* that "history is a slaughter-bench of nations." The recurring tragic element in history is that wars — "Righteous Wars" — are won but peace does not become established. It seems as if there is a vicious regress in human action; the *Gītā* names regress *Karma-bandha,* "bondage-in-action"; therefore, "so act as to be free from *Karma-bandha*": this is the law of action. While it retires to the forest to practise its faith in austerity and meditation, *tapaḥ śraddhe ye hi upavasanti araṇye,* as the Upaniṣad says, the philosophic Indian mind chooses the battlefield in the *Gītā* to meditate and enter into a dialogue on "action" and "inaction" there, on the battlefield, symbol of history and the encounter between Good and Evil; the man of "action" instructed by the man of "no-action" summons an understanding courage that yields not; instructed to be free from delusion and fear in its resolution for action, the heroic in man is *commanded*

to "arise for battle without the fever of battle," *yuddhasva vigatajvaraḥ*:

> Action rightly renounced brings freedom;
> Action rightly performed brings freedom:
> Both are better
> Than mere shunning of action.

14. But why is there no "shunning of action"? Why is there the commandment to "arise" for battle which seems so much like love of war? The answer is: Because there is evil. There is evil; therefore, there *ought* to be resistance to evil; but as resistance to evil appears, paradoxically enough, *as if* it takes on the form of that which it resists, there arises the delusion that total withdrawal from action is what is totally good. But the delusion that arises does not understand that in "non-action" or withdrawal from resistance to evil there is a kind of *action* which is nothing other than co-operation with evil. The philosophy of action in Indian culture is therefore an insight into "the inaction that is in action, and the action that is in inaction."

15. Now, if the philosophy of history in Indian culture is essentially a philosophy of action — action but no "shunning of action" — and if the nature of action that "makes" history involves essentially resistance to evil, then, we have lighted upon a sovereign idea of the philosophy of history in Indian culture; for according to Indian culture, it is *dharma* that resists evil: *Yato dharmastato jayaḥ,* "Victory waits upon righteousness" — this is the substance of its two Epics. If this is the case, then the idea of history in Indian culture has changed from a perspective of its conception of time to a perspective which transcends time — transcends past, present, and future, and cause and effect. And resistance to evil is also a bridge between the ascent of man and the descent of the Divine, the two other ingredients of its philosophy of history.

16. The philosophy of history, involving a philosophy of action, is resistance to evil. But where does the resistance to evil begin? No-one can resist evil in history who has not resisted it within himself. This is the *Yogi* who is the symbol of the ascent of man, his enlightenment, and his perfection in thought and action. The dialogue on the battlefield on the nature of "action" and "inaction" becomes therefore a dialogue on the characteristics of the sage. Yoga is the "making" of man, the making of man who makes "new" history, and history is made when such individuals arise; in the examples of such men, history is philosophy teaching by examples. In the metaphysic of history there is therefore a distinction between appearance and reality. The individual within whom resistance to evil goes on is the reality behind the phenomena of history, and the arising of such individuals is history and the goal of history. "The

level of truth of history is only the level of truth of the individual" (Ramana Maharshi).

17. In the philosophy of Indian culture, its philosophy of history is ultimately involved in the limits and possibilities of cosmic order. And cosmic order involves an "ultimate irrationality." For, according to the philosophy of Indian culture, the Unborn, the Eternal, and the Formless takes on form by a free necessity of its divine nature. By a process of "self-emptying," as it were, which yet leaves the Divine what it is in its Fullness, *Pūrṇa*, the Divine becomes — becomes human — to *be* beside man in the hour of his need; to *be* his guide, friend, philosopher, and saviour; to help man in his resistance to evil and in his efforts to establish a Kingdom of God on earth. And, according to the philosophy of Indian culture, the Divine Becoming, which is involved in its Being, is an "event" that *recurs* from age to age: this is the Descent of the Divine, the *Avatār*, "One Who Descends":

When goodness grows weak,
When evil increases,
I make myself a body,
In every age I come back
To deliver the holy,
To destroy the sin of the sinner,
To establish righteousness.

A philosophy of history in Indian culture is involved in or involves a philosophy of religion, founded on a faith that in the "moving wheel" of time there is a *manifestation* of the Divine "from age to age." And so the order of history in Indian culture is the history of this order.

18. Thus, in the progress of the argument in expanding the idea of history in Indian culture, there is a return to the idea of a cycle with which it started. And the idea of a cycle is not merely the "periodicity" of events that is there in Nature, in which no event occurs which has not occurred "before." The idea of a cycle that the philosophy of history in Indian culture involves is more significant than mere "periodicity." The idea means that the kingdom of God will come again because it has already come and history is involved in a sequence: from a fact which occurred in a "timeless" past — in "ages past" — to the fulfilment of a prophecy in the ages to come. This means that (universal) history is the fulfilment of a prophecy or that there is no prophecy which has not also been a fact of history. Furthermore, the idea of cycles entails a plurality of cycles: i.e., not only a *succession* of cycles but a *simultaneity* of co-existent cycles. And each cycle or age, *Yuga*, is a fulfilment. So it follows that cosmic order is a succession within a succession, each

cycle having its "B.C." and "A.D." to "date" the events of that cycle. Therefore, the conception of time in the philosophy of Indian culture as a "moving wheel," and the notion of a succession within a succession that it involves, seem to entail a theory of relativity long before the Theory of Relativity was conceived and expounded. And it seems that the philosophy of Indian culture, which is in quest of the Absolute, is a quest of the Absolute which rules out "absolutes," *neti, neti* — e.g.: Absolute time? Not this, not this.

19. Lastly, the metaphysic of the idea of history in Indian culture is consistent with the metaphysics of Indian culture, a metaphysics which rejects, in the Upaniṣads, the *Gītā,* and Buddhism, the antinomial "Either — Or": either "chance" or "Necessity" or "Inevitability"; either "Determinism" or "Freedom"; etc. And in the philosophy of Indian culture, there is no conception of "historical inevitability." On the contrary, the philosophy of history in Indian culture is the notion of a "Middle Path" between "chance" and "inevitability"; and the "Middle Path" is a neutral conception of dependence — a notion of the general relation of "follow from" — which defines *passage* or the becomingness of Nature as well as *process,* the process of "challenge and response" in history. "This being, that becomes; the ceasing of this is the ceasing of that." "Dependent-origination," as this is called in Buddhism, is a denial of absolute beginnings and absolute ends, and a denial that anything arises or perishes absolutely. Through this conception of "dependent-origination," the philosophy of Indian culture applies one of its great ideas, the idea of order, to succession and sequence and to its conception of time as a "moving wheel." And in applying the notion of order to sequence and succession and to the notion of process in history, Indian culture does not extend a causal explanation to history and bring history, the realm of ends, under natural science, the realm of nature, but appears to see in history the operation of a *rational* principle, the principle of sufficient Reason: "This being, that becomes; the ceasing of this, is the ceasing of that." In Indian culture, this principle operates as a Law — the Law of Karma — which, like the Law of Gravitation, is universal but unlike it applies without exception to the actions of individuals and nations alike. In the "Decline and Fall" of individuals and nations, the historian is like the astronomer, an observer of the operation of this Law.

20. But there is, in contemporary Indian philosophy, a Gandhian philosophy of history. Why should Gandhi, who was essentially a man of action, interpret history unless the idea of history is in necessary relation to action? There are two elements in the Gandhian philosophy of history: (*a*) Gandhi's distinction between means and ends; and (*b*) his distinc-

tion between "recorded" and "unrecorded" history. Gandhi said that in action not only must the end be good but the means also must be right; and he added that if we take care of the means, the end will take care of itself. Why? Because, there is present in the Gandhian philosophy the same paradox that is present in classical Indian culture, viz.: *Perfecting the Means to attain the End is the End of life.* In the Gandhian philosophy of action, Non-violence is a means to Truth. But what is the Truth which is the end to which Non-violence is a means except Non-violence?

(*b*) If the Gandhian distinction between "recorded" and "unrecorded" history is valid, then it means that: (i) while it is necessary to "observe" in order to "record," (ii) it may not be the case that all that is "recorded" is all that is "observed"; or, (iii) all that is "observed" is all that has "happened." Two brothers quarrel, says Gandhi, and their quarrel becomes the talk of the town, while nobody notices the otherwise peaceful life they have lived, and so Gandhi says that their quarrel is an "interruption" of the otherwise "natural course" of the peaceful life they have lived. There arises therefore in the Gandhian philosophy, a distinction between what is "recorded," which is an "interruption," and what is "unrecorded," which is a "natural course." Arguing from this distinction, Gandhi says that "soul-force," being "natural" to man, is not "recorded" in "recorded history": therefore, what is "unrecorded" is what is a "natural course," whereas, what is "recorded" is an "interruption" of what is a "natural course." Now, just as the man of action *understands*, in the *Gītā*, what action is when he sees "the inaction that is in action, and the action that is in inaction," so we *understand* history in Gandhi when we understand the "unrecorded history" that is in "recorded" history and "recorded" history as an "interruption" of "unrecorded" history. "Unrecorded history" is the "unwritten" story of man which will never be "written": it is the story of the sufferings that good men have borne without retaliation, the story of the brotherliness of man with man even amidst wars. But it is not merely the story of the endurance of man; it is the story of man who has prevailed, who shall prevail. And so, man shall find in "unrecorded" history that by which he shall live and know what he truly is, *Ātmā*, "spirit," and not "brute," as Gandhi said, and so obey the higher Law of his "spirit."

N. A. NIKAM

Note:

If the idea of history involves the idea of "histories," then, "dating" an event is a complicated process; to date an event many co-ordinates are necessary, and the co-ordinates necessary refer not only to time but involve reference to space. Indeed, dating an event involves or implies something like the noting

of the relativity, relativity of space and time or space-time. This means that Indian Culture, far from having no historical sense, has a very rigid historical sense. For, to date an event the co-ordinates necessary are: The particular Age in the cycle of Ages or *Yugas* and the particular phase of that Age; the geographical location on the earth as a Planet, viz., the particular Continent among the Continents and the particular part of the Cotinent; then the particular year in the cycle of the sixty years; the path of the sun in that year, the northern or the southern path; then the season and the month, and the path of the moon in that month, the dark or the bright path; then the star that is then ascendent in the daily revolution of stars; and the particular day of the week, and the hour of the day, after sunrise or sunset, and so on: all these are involved necessarily in the notion of "dating" an event; the act or acts involved in performing a ceremony as an act of commitment is an "event." In history, an "act" is an "event."

Gratitude or thankfulness is another virtue of great lustre, and so esteemed by God and all good men. It is an acknowledgement of benefits received, to the honour of those that confer them. It is indeed a noble sort of justice, with this difference though, that since benefits exceed justice, the tie is greater to be thankful than to be just; and consequently there is something baser in ingratitude than injustice. So that though you are not obliged by law to repay, your virtue, honour, and humanity naturally pledge you to be thankful, and by how much the less you are under external ties, consider your inward ties so much the stronger.

—WILLIAM PENN

FRANCIS H. ANGOLD

The Correlation of Opposites as Symbolic of Eternal Values

[The Rev. Francis H. Angold has taken a particular interest in anthropology and music in addition to philosophy and literature. This article represents a complex line of thought which is centred on the paradox that man is finite and mortal and yet a child of the infinite and the eternal. The Rev. Mr. Angold sees all opposites as not simply contraries but as the opposite poles within a harmonious though paradoxical reality.—ED.]

AUGUSTE COMTE (1798–1857) made the bold assertion: Everything is relative, that is the only absolute principle."[1] If we recognize the fact of the universe being a complete whole, we are instinctively compelled to accept the truth that everything in this universe is in some way related. The extraordinary thing is that while this truth is essentially simple, it is found to be difficult of acceptance.

It is not the nature of the relationship which tends to confound, but the undue importance we attach to similarity. While we are invariably disposed to recognize that which seems to be related, we are on the contrary loth to accept that which appears to be dissimilar. The obvious should be sufficient to dispel unbelief. In the case of children, we are quite prepared to recognize parentage even when there is no apparent likeness to their supposed progenitors. On the other hand we are at times too ready to discern a likeness which in truth does not exist.

As an anthropologist I was somewhat confounded when visiting the home of a boy who had been brought to my notice. On meeting the lady whom I had come to know as the boy's mother, and complimenting her on the likeness between them, I was somewhat chastened when she pointed out the improbability of such by reason of the fact that the real parents of the boy were Chinese. In actual fact too often our assessments are based upon the superficial rather than any basis of reality.

The presence of opposites serves to emphasize the unity of the whole; we comprehend the constructive character of the positive, only in contrast to the actionless nature of the negative. Light could never be fully appreciated but for the experience of darkness. Good is seen to be a transcendent quality only to the extent that we know evil to be a demoralizing element. Classical drama, from which the rather feeble-minded examples of modern times derive, is primarily devoted to the conflict between Good and Evil.

---

[1] Quoted in *The Peasant of Garonne* by JACQUES MARITAIN (1968), p. 7

Thus we observe that religion in the broadest sense of the term is essentially concerned with a dramatic act. Man having become divorced from his Source has of necessity to be reconciled and by means of this action to be restored to his former nature. This in essence is the basis of all religion; the differences upon which we place so much importance are but the superficialities of expression. Fundamentally religion is the attempt to relate man to his Source and in so doing to unite the two seeming opposites: Good must be seen to triumph over Evil; Man must in some way be related to God. The question in regard to eternal values is to what extent, in the process of evaluation, Man acquires divinity, and God takes on the nature of humanity. The problem confronting the modern theologian is not unlike that which perplexed the exponent of classical religion. Diana, the moon-goddess, became enamoured of Endymion; this gave rise to the question:

> Is Diana now a mortal
> Or Endymion a God?[2]

We shall pursue this subject along three lines: (1) the necessity of conception; (2) the measure of understanding; (3) the medium of communication.

In order to appreciate the relevance and importance of correlation it becomes a necessity to establish some kind of concept. We have already observed that the reality of the Whole involves the relationship of the parts: nothing exists which is unnecessary; everything which is has a function to perform. An appreciation of the situation as thus defined does not necessarily involve a concept. As is the case with the majority of people, the universe represents some form of creative activity, behind which there supposedly exists a generative Being. This is what we have in mind as the cardinal deity to which our worship is directed. If such constitutes the basic idea, its interpretation becomes both manifold and diverse.

Christianity, and more particularly the Church, has devised a whole system of celestial beings, set in opposition to hosts of evil spirits, over which preside respectively, the supreme powers of Good and Evil. The Old Testament reeks with this idea and the New Testament perpetuates its imagery. Heaven becomes the abode of Good, and Hell in consequence the fruition of evil. Either we have to recognize the unity of the universe, or regard it as a battleground for two warring opposites.

The universe, being a creative entity, can never remain static; it must progress. Man achieves his self-development in proportion to his

---

[2] *Sixty Thousand Nights*. Devised by VAL MAY (Plays of the Year. 31, 443)

apprehension of a conception: he becomes what he is destined to be only to the extent that he comprehends the potentiality of his becoming. In the final analysis it is not circumstance which thwarts human development but ignorance of our possibilities of achievement.

If the universe is one, then, we being part of this universe, the total power envisaged by the universe is at our disposal. The universe is the weaker bereft of our contribution but likewise we are the stronger by virtue of our relationship to the whole. All the seeming opposites serve but one purpose, namely to emphasize the progressive nature of the whole, and to highlight man in relation to God. If God represents the sum-total of all power, man becomes an integral part of godhead. Man is in consequence seen not as the opposite of God but rather as the partial definition of godhead. Pierre Teilhard de Chardin wrote:

> It is not a question of superimposing Christ upon the world, but of "panchristizing" the Universe. The delicate point (I have partly touched on it in *Christologie et Evolution*) is that, in pursuing this line of thought, one is led not merely to an enlargement of views, but to a reversal of perspectives: Evil (no longer punishment for a fault, but "sign and effect" of Progress) and Matter (no longer a guilty and inferior element, but "the stuff of Spirit") take on a meaning diametrically opposed to the meaning *habitually* considered Christian.
>
> Gradually everything is being transformed: the moral is fused with the physical, individuality extended into Universality, matter becomes the structure of Spirit.[3]

The vindication of the creative nature of the universe is to be found in the constant renewal of the earth and its creatures. The process which is apparent in the physical world is not less active in the realm of thought; man is ever coming to a fuller measure of understanding. Socrates was concerned that man should know himself. It has also been affirmed that man is the measure of all things.

> Man is his own star, and the soul that can
> Render an honest and a perfect man
> Commands all light, all influence, all fate;
> Nothing to him falls early, or too late,
> Our acts our angels are, or good or ill,
> Our fatal shadows that walk by us still.[4]

The complicated intellectualism of Hinduism led up to the enlightenment of Buddhism. Reason in Greece and Prophecy in Israel prepared the way for the Logos — the Word made flesh. Jesus was hanged not in

---

[3] Quoted in *The Peasant of Garonne*, p. 123; see also Isaiah, v. 20-21

[4] "Upon The Honest Man's Fortune," by JOHN FLETCHER (1576-1625)

accordance with Roman law but at the instigation of Israel's leaders. The Hebrew hierarchy accomplished the death of Jesus because he sought to give emphasis to the spirit rather than the letter of the Law.[5] Jesus was at pains to point out: the sabbath was made for man, not man for the sabbath.[6]

Buddha and Jesus both stressed the fundamental issues; man doth not live by bread alone.[7] In the words of Donne

> He was the Word, that spake it;
> He took the bread and brake it;
> And what that Word did make it,
> I do believe and take it.[8]

The stages of human development are reflected in the changing concepts of community life. In times when man lived in perpetual fear of attack the castle was the focal point, offering as it did a measure of protection. In more settled conditions the church became the centre of social life. With the development of trade and commerce, consequent upon still more settled conditions, the market came to occupy the place of importance. Thus we observe this continual assessment of values and their relationship to everyday existence. The power is the abiding constant, at first conceived in the castle, later the church and still more recently the market.

At each stage of development we see the juxtaposition of opposites: man in conflict with the invaders; man in the struggle with evil; and lastly man in the process of barter. In each of these aspects we are able to discern the effort made by man to protect what he deems to be inviolate; his property, his person, his wealth. From this it becomes obvious that there exists in the mind of man the concept of that which is eternal; something which must be preserved at all costs. Man, even in seeking to defend that which is perishable, testifies to a belief in eternal values, symbolized as they often are by seeming opposites.

Man can only appreciate good when it is personified; thus it was that Buddha and Jesus in their day revealed the way, the truth and the life.[9] They preached not the extinction of the material but that the spiritual becomes the dominating factor of human experience; both proclaimed the path of renunciation as the portal to life and life more abundant.[10]

---

[5] John, VI. 63
[6] Mark, II. 27
[7] Matthew, IV. 4
[8] "On the Sacrament" (*Divine Poems*)
[9] John, XIV. 6
[10] Luke, IX. 23; John, X. 10; see also *A Manual of Buddhism* by DUDLEY WRIGHT (1912), p. 8

No finite being can grasp in its entirety the splendour of the Infinite; no single member can hope to adequately comprehend the magnitude of the Whole. In the words of the apostle Paul, "we know in part."[11]

Everything that lives has a lesson to teach us, every sentient being has a truth to unfold. It is not that one idea of God is right to the exclusion of all others, but rather that every idea concerning the Source of being makes a contribution to our greater understanding.

Unfortunately, we have come to think of language as the sole medium of communication. Whatever enables us to see more clearly the eternal values is a means of communication. Thus the symbol stands as it has ever done, not merely as a means whereby we give expression to our belief, but at the same time wherein we foster our apprehension of that which is indefinable. Poets and musicians alike make use of sounds in order to convey sublime truth; the artist using forms of another kind does the same. Each of these in their several ways portrays the dramatic act of bringing man into relationship with his Source. Running through the majestic music dramas of Wagner is the great theme of redemption. In all art we discover the truth of that which is enacted in order to accomplish the reconciliation of man with God. In the words of Edward Young, "the course of nature is the art of God."[12] To which we may add: "In brief, all things are artificial; for Nature is the art of God."[13]

The wise are not necessarily the educated and still less the intellectual; the rural dweller may well display a far greater understanding than the urban resident. Wisdom is not the measure of knowledge but the use to which such understanding is put. The wise man while observing the presence of the false becomes more certain of the effectiveness of that which is true. In the words of Paul:

> ...God hath chosen the foolish things of the world to confound the wise; and God hath chosen the weak things of the world to confound the things which are mighty;
>
> And base things of the world, and things which are despised, hath God chosen, yea, and things which are not, to bring to nought things that are:
>
> That no flesh should glory in his presence.[14]

The Ultimate Reality is Spirit. The Old Testament uses graphic imagery when it describes the Creation: Jacques Maritain sums it up thus:[15]

> The world was created good (which does not mean that it was created

[11] I Corinthians, XIII. 9

[12] "Night Thoughts," Night IX, Line 1267

[13] *Religio Medici* by SIR THOMAS BROWNE (1605-82), Pt. I, Sect. XVI

[14] I Corinthians, I. 27-28

[15] *The Peasant of Garonne*, pp. 30-31

divine). It was created good, its natural structures are good in themselves: the Bible intends to get this into our heads once and for all. "God (Elohim) saw that the light was good."[16]

And in the same way, at the succeeding stages of creation, "God saw that it was good" keeps returning like a refrain.[17]

And on the sixth day, after man had been created, "God saw everything that he had made, and behold, it was very good."[18]

Because the Ultimate Reality is Spirit it is GOOD = GOD. Everything that tends to exalt this supreme truth is light and all that serves to diminish its lustre is darkness. Jesus the Word made flesh,[19] came that we might discern the eternal values, and walk in the path that leads to life eternal: "The soul's calm sun-shine and the heart-felt joy."[20]

FRANCIS H. ANGOLD

Disquietude arises from an immoderate desire to be freed from an evil which we feel, or to gain the good which we hope for. And yet there is nothing which makes the evil worse and which removes the good to a greater distance than disquietude and worry. Birds are caught in nets and snares because when they find themselves entrapped they struggle and move immoderately to escape from it, and in doing so they entangle themselves so much the more. When, then, you are pressed with the desire of being freed from some evil, or of attaining some good, before all things place your spirit in a state of repose and tranquillity, calm your judgement and your will. And then, quite softly and gently, pursue the end of your desire, taking in order the means which will be suitable. And when I say quite softly, I do not wish to say negligently, but without worry, trouble, and disquietude. Otherwise, in place of giving effect to your desire, you will spoil everything, and will embarrass yourself very greatly.

—ST. FRANCIS DE SALES

---

[16] Genesis, I. 4

[17] Genesis, I. 10, 12, 18, 21, 25

[18] Genesis, I. 31

[19] John, I. 14

[20] "Essay on Man" by ALEXANDER POPE (1688-1744), Epistle IV, Line 168

P. NAGARAJA RAO

The Concept of *Moksha*

[Dr. P. Nagaraja Rao is well known to our readers by his many contributions on philosophy and many will remember his articles recently on *Dharma, Artha,* and *Kāma.* In this article he completes his consideration of the four *puruṣārthas* — the aims which govern human life. Dr. Nagaraja Rao expounds *Mokṣa* as the ultimate value which links together philosophical truth and religious aspiration. At the end of this article he brings out that a true understanding of *Mokṣa* should nourish more, not less, concern for the welfare of others. This realization has been brought out more strongly in the Buddhist teaching about the great Bodhisattvas who renounce *Nirvāṇa* in order to remain with a mankind in need of spiritual guidance and help.—ED.]

THE SUPREME SPIRITUAL IDEAL for all the schools of Indian philosophy is *Mokṣa.* It is described as the *parama puruṣārtha.* All the other values are oriented to it. *Dharma,* that golden word, signifies within its simple confines all the wisdom and experience of centuries of the Hindu quest. It not only regulates all internal values in their operation here and now, but also orients them to *Mokṣa.* It is the postulation of *Mokṣa* as the ideal that is responsible for the close association of philosophy with religion in all the Indian schools of thought. It is a *practical* ideal, which we are advised to seek for certain ends. It is the affirmation of this ideal that makes philosophy in India more than speculative and intellectual.

The Indian philosophical systems have analysed human experience and disclosed that man on earth is subject to a threefold suffering: *ādhyātmika, ādhibhautika,* and *ādhidaivika,* i.e., resulting from the Self, Nature, and supernatural forces. Wisdom beckons men to put a radical end to all suffering by attaining *Mokṣa,* a state of no tension or strife, with all doubts and disbeliefs dispelled. *Mokṣa* is the Indian pragmatic ideal which states that Truth is the only sound guide for man in his search for salvation; unlike the American Pragmatists, it does not measure truth in terms of the practical.

The Upaniṣads, the *Gītā,* and the epics are all one in acclaiming that the chief destiny of man is *Mokṣa* and he must pursue that value and count no cost too great to attain it. Sanat-Kumāra holds that *Mokṣa* "is infinite happiness. There is no happiness in anything small, only the *bhūma* (the great) is happy. One must desire to attain the *bhūma.*" Nārada, after realizing the futility of the knowledge of all secular sciences, desperately seeks self-knowledge; for it would enable him to ford over

sorrow. Self-knowledge is described as the greatest value. The search for it is the greatest imperative of the scriptures. The scriptures seek to interest men in its quest by extolling its profound value and by bringing home to those who are indifferent to it their immense loss. The *Chāndogya Upaniṣad* says he is a miserable man (*kṛpaṇaḥ*) who lives and dies without striving for *Mokṣa*. The *Kena Upaniṣad* describes the man who does not strive for *Mokṣa* as the one that has sustained the greatest loss (*mahatī vinaṣṭiḥ*). The *Gītā* holds the view that "there is no greater gain for man after attaining *Mokṣa*." In the search for *Mokṣa*, men in the past have given up their all — their belongings, attachment to wife and children, pride of scholarship — leaving all, they have sought *Mokṣa* as mendicants. The great poet Kālidāsa, in the concluding verse of his famous drama *Śākuntala*, makes his valedictory verse a prayer to the Lord to aid him to attain *Mokṣa* and overcome rebirth. He writes:

> May the King exert himself for the good of his subjects, may literature great in its revealed scriptures be honoured, may the self-existent God Śiva united with Śakti, put an end also to my rebirth.

The elder Bhīṣma gives an elaborate and learned discourse on *Mokṣa Dharma* to Yudhiṣṭhira. The *Mokṣa* idea has always brooded over the imagination, minds, and activities of the Hindus.

The wisdom of the quest for *Mokṣa* is disclosed by an acute analysis of human experience and man's desire to escape from the mixed nature of human life to the enjoyment of unalloyed bliss. Professor Hiriyanna has clinched the issue in neat sentences:

> Indian philosophy aims beyond Logic. This peculiarity of the viewpoint is to be ascribed to the fact that philosophy in India did not take its rise in wonder or curiosity as it seems to have done in the West; rather it originated under the pressure of a practical need arising from the presence of moral and physical evil in life. It is the problem of how to remove this evil that troubled the ancient Indian most, and *Mokṣa* in all the systems represents a state in which it is, in one sense or another, taken to have been overcome. Philosophic endeavour was directed primarily to find a remedy for the ills of life. ...

Mokṣa is in essence a primary experience that is integral. It is not like reverie, dream, or drug-induced hallucination. It is a total integral experience in which one feels a complete sense of life's fruition and suffers from no privation whatever. There is no diminution or return to the world of *saṁsāra* from that unexcellable bliss. It is described in the Upaniṣads as "the nature of truth that gives life repose ... fills the mind with joy and spreads full peace."

Mokṣa is not realized in a vacuum. It is not a social product, but it is achieved by right living here and now. The training insisted on for its realization gives a prominent and necessary place to morality and *Dharma*. Ethical excellence is the fundamental prerequisite of all spiritual life. God can never be realized if one attempts to by-pass the good life. The Upaniṣad declares:

> ... not he who has not desisted from evil ways, not he who is not tranquil, not he who has not a concentrated mind, not even he whose mind is not composed can realize the self through knowledge.

The *Gītā* categorically states: "Thoughtless men whose souls are undisciplined do not find God even though they strive." Kṛṣṇa adds: "He who has full faith and zeal and who has subdued his senses obtains divine experience, and once when he obtains it he soon gets peace." The negative side of it is also stated: "The ignorant and the one who has no faith and who always doubts, goes to ruin. There is no salvation nor happiness for the man here who always doubts." *Mokṣa* is the fulfilment of the close adherence to all the other three values, *artha* and *kāma* regulated by *Dharma*.

The concept of *Mokṣa* affirms the divine aspect of man's nature and discloses his spiritual essence and potentialities. It treats man not as a mere object among other objects; for he is a subject. The physical and the psychical aspects do not exhaust the nature of man. It needs the spiritual to complete the picture.

The concept is described in Indian thought in three distinct forms against the background of a complete acceptance that *Mokṣa* is the chief axiological value for man. The state opposed to *Mokṣa* is described as bondage or *Saṁsāra*. It is a state of man's unregenerate life and is clouded by ignorance (*ajñāna*). To Śrī-Śaṅkara, *Mokṣa* is the destruction of *ajñāna*, which is responsible for the illusory vision of plurality. The individual soul who thinks, in his delusion, that he is a banished stranger tied down to a body of lust, with no glimmer of wisdom, comes to realize that he is *Brahman*. *Mokṣa* is native to the soul of man. It is not derivative or bestowed by anyone else. It is man's spiritual birthright, and not the exclusive possession of some only. It is not something that is produced new (*utpādya*). It is a making known of what is already there and not a bringing into being of something which is not there. It is "the uncreated light" in us. It is not a to-be-attained something that we do not have (*prāpya*). It is also not to be brought about by the transformation of something into something else (*saṁskārya*). It is the natural state of the soul (*sahajāvasthā*), which is hidden by ignorance. Such in short

is the Advaita view of *Mokṣa*. The theistic Vedāntins explain *Mokṣa* as the greatest and exclusive gift of the Lord to men proceeding from his infinite grace and compassion. It is the result of God's *prasāda*, grace, and not the result of mere human effort. It is not self-extinction; it is attaining fellowship with the Lord and perfecting one's self in self-surrendering devotion to the Lord.

Buddhism and Jainism hold a third view: that *Mokṣa* is the annihilation of the ego in a man by a firm self-effort, a systematic discipline of self-culture based on virtue, concentration, and wisdom (*Śīla, Samādhi*, and *Prajñā*). The Buddha exhorts man, in the words Sir Edwin Arnold puts into his mouth:

> ... seek
> Nought from the helpless gods by gift and hymn,
> Nor bribe with blood, nor feed with fruits and cakes;
> Within yourselves deliverance must be sought;
> Each man his prison makes.

A few critics of the concept hold the view that the major preoccupation with striving for *Mokṣa* breeds indifference and contempt for the fine things of the world, and that ethical life loses all its significance when we consider everything vain and transitory.

But Indian thought recognizes the importance of the other three values and aspirations of human life. Spiritual men have never held a negative view of life, as is clear from their account of the three *puruṣārthas*. *Saṁsāra*, in the words of Dr. S. Radhakrishnan, "is a succession of spiritual opportunities." The world is the training ground, the "vale of soul-making" in Keats's words. Our Upaniṣads have described two chief characteristics of spiritual experience: (*a*) its uniqueness and (*b*) the pervasiveness of the spirit of Reality experienced in *Mokṣa*. The consciousness of the pervasive nature of Reality and its indwelling presence in all the manifestations of Reality spontaneously creates in us "a reverence for life." It is this fundamental consciousness of the presence of this Reality in all which makes for the fellowship of all human beings. It is spiritual experience that is responsible for our feeling, in the words of Gandhiji, "there cannot be happiness for any of us until it is won for all." The man of spiritual experience has proved truth and ethical values on his pulses, and they burn into him, and flow out from him spontaneously. He shows forth virtue without any sense of constraint or effort.

P. NAGARAJA RAO

New Books and Old

Ethics for Today*

SIXTY YEARS separate these two books. The first is a reprint of Part II of a textbook of ethics originally published in 1908; the second was published in 1969. That they can still be read together with so much profit, and with the experience that each one illuminates the other, is evidence of the prophetic greatness of Dewey's thought and the relevance of his writing to some of the central issues of our time.

> There never was a time in the history of the world [Dewey writes] when human relationships and their accompanying rights and duties needed the sympathetic application of intelligent thought as they do at present.

This sense of urgency is as keenly felt, and forcefully expressed, by James Hemming in the context of 1969:

> The authority operating in the modern world is the authority of knowledge, relationships, situations, purposes — calling for constant thought, constant judgement, constant sensitivity, constant humanity, constant responsibility.

Both writers emphasize the far-reaching changes in the climate of thought, sweeping away for ever the old absolutes and the external sanctions of conduct, and forcing man to find new, stable foundations for personal and social living; both are vigorously hopeful in their attitudes and their conclusions. Each insists in his own way that the principles of a good life, both personal and social, must be based on the essential nature of man and society; each insists on the *integrity* of experience and of man's response to challenge, and warns his readers against thinking of "virtues" and "qualities" as isolated units of character instead of as aspects of one self-consistent whole. Each quotes with approval Milton's famous words: "I cannot praise a fugitive and cloistered virtue, unexercised and unbreathed." And each records his protest against the "tendency to overestimate the past and exaggerate contemporary laxity." Hemming's protest is reinforced by some telling evidence.

> Imperfect we are — inevitably; foolish we are — often; rank bad — frequently. But *worse* we are not. The pessimists who denigrate the present should read more history.

A group of ordinary working men in England were asked recently to state (anonymously) which two of the following goods they would choose to *keep,* supposing they were obliged to lose three out of the five: one-third of their income; their home; someone to love; someone to love them; their left hand. The results of this secret ballot were:

1. Someone to love (478)
2. Someone to love me (466)
3. My left hand (266)
4. My house (159)
5. My income (100)

And, says Hemming, we say that our society is materialist! In truth, men are hungry to love and be loved.

Similar as their approach is, the two books are very different. Dewey's is a good general textbook, and it has been reprinted in India as such. The work has been well done and the book should make a valuable contribution. While it surveys, on a systematic plan, the broad ethical issues in their historical context, and indicates the contributions of the various "isms," its purpose is far wider than a mere preparation for the examination hall. Dewey seeks to stimulate his reader to pursue abiding *interests* with zest and enjoyment and freely-accepted self-discipline; equally, he seeks to arouse us to search for a socio-

**Theory of the Moral Life.* By JOHN DEWEY. With an Introduction by ARNOLD ISENBERG. (Wiley Eastern Private Ltd., New Delhi. 179 pp. 1967. Rs. 2.00); *Individual Morality. By* JAMES HEMMING. (Thomas Nelson and Sons, London. 261 pp. 1969. 42*s*.)

political pattern of human association which will encourage adequate moral purposes and standards. But these ideas are thrown out rather than worked out, and it is when we turn to Hemming's book, which suffers from no textbook limitations, that we find stimulating and often controversial illustrations of these themes.

Hemming analyses the immediate consequences of the revolution in man's understanding of himself and the universe which evolutionary theory and modern cosmology between them have accomplished. He is concerned like Dewey for society: "Social irresponsibility in today's [technological] world is intolerably dangerous, yet the nature of modern society encourages it." He discusses the psychological foundations of our malaise, the backlog of "negative" moral formulations which hamper us, and the way in which our new knowledge, incomplete as it is, may be applied to such problems as aggressiveness and sexual frustration.

Hemming also touches on two aspects of the moral life which Dewey's book almost completely excludes. There are two profoundly interesting chapters on the mystery of our personal being, that deep arena of our moral struggles, and on its relation to the religious quest, to systematized religion (writing in England, he treats this in a Christian context), and to secular humanism. The reviewer must here refrain from many "quotable quotes."

The other aspect of moral concern is one that was hardly envisaged at all when Dewey wrote. And here Hemming should be quoted:

> There is an even more profound responsibility than self and social development. We represent a rare and precious achievement of life ... We have in our hands the power and the knowledge to destroy the quality, if not the substance, of life as we know it. Already magnificent creatures like the whale are threatened with extinction. Forests fall that our newspapers may be unnecessarily fat. Population spreads like a plague, stamping the earth bare; overcrowding blunts the power to live. ... The contemporary foundation for moral values is acceptance of responsibility for ourselves, for one another and for the future ... *within a habitat that man should reverence, protect and hand on not only intact but enriched.* [Italics ours]

There are many more good things; these may suffice to whet the appetite.

MARJORIE SYKES

The Bhagavad Gita. Translated from the Sanskrit with an Introduction by JUAN MASCARÓ. (Rider and Company, London. 128 pp. 1970. 28*s.*, i.e. £1.40)

It is a pleasure to commend most warmly this lovely rendering of the *Bhagavad-Gita,* which, first appearing in 1962 as a Penguin Classic, is now reissued by Rider and Company in handsome format, a notable feature being the jacket-photograph of a ninth-century standing Vishnu from Nepal — Vishnu, the Preserver, the second person of the Hindu Trinity, of whom Shri-Krishna, the Lord of the *Gita,* is an *Avatar.*

Unlike many of the new translations of the Bible, the *Gita* has never yet been handled "in committee," every version of it having been the work of some individual devotee who approached it with loving insight and did not find it necessary, for the sake of clarity, to sacrifice the *mantric* quality of the ancient words.

Professor Mascaró stands nobly in this line, for his *rapport* with his subject goes beyond his Sanskrit scholarship. Deeply reverencing its poetry and beauty, he let more than twenty years' gestation precede the actual work, and the fine fruits of that patience show abundant fulfilment of his aim of giving "the spiritual meaning of the *Gita* in pure English." His English is indeed as felicitous as in his rendering of some of the great passages from the Upanishads published in John Murray's "Wisdom of the East Series" under the title

Himalayas of the Soul.

Professor Mascaró at one time held the post of Vice-Principal of Parameshvara College, Ceylon; so that direct contact with that wisdom has enriched his natal dower of Spanish mysticism. He now lives in Cambridge, where he is lecturer and supervisor, and where he shared his Eastern interests with the late Hugh I'Anson Fausset, to whom the present book is dedicated. Its pages include an enlightening Preface and a beautiful and helpful Introduction.

Incidentally, the Anchor Press (printers) and the binder, William Brendon, both of Tiptree, Essex, well deserve their meed of praise.

JOAN N. BURNETT

The Religion of Tibet. By SIR CHARLES BELL. (Oxford University Press, London. 235 pp. Reprinted 1968. Rs. 30.00)

Sir Charles Bell lived among Tibetans on terms of the closest intimacy for over twenty years and was the diplomatic representative of the Indian Government in Tibet for twelve. In addition to the time which the intricacy of Tibetan affairs rightly claimed, Bhutan was constantly seeking his advice in her own administrative problems. Sikkim was under his direct administration; and, even when its young ruler took over the Government of the State, he consulted Sir Charles in matters of difficulty. Sir Charles had therefore great opportunities of intimate contact with the people of these countries. He was a rare type of administrator, who in addition to his involvement in practical affairs found time and inclination to devote himself to Oriental research in the company of Oriental friends. The result was a series of books on the religious, social, and historical development of Tibet. *The Religion of Tibet* is a sequel to his *Tibet Past and Present* and *The People of Tibet.* Like them, it is a description of conditions in the earlier part of the twentieth century. It was first published in 1931, and this republication after thirty-seven years is abundant evidence that neither the flux of time nor the sad change in Tibet's political fortunes has dated it.

Part One deals with the old faith, known to the Tibetans as Pön, which appears to have been a form of Shamanism or Nature Worship. This primitive religion consisted in a belief in spirits of the earth and sky, who had to be worshipped or propitiated according as they were good or bad spirits. Every third year there would be a grand ceremony during which all were assembled in the night on a raised altar on which were spread savoury meats, the victims being horses, oxen, asses, sheep, dogs, and monkeys. Expelling of devils who bring sickness and other ills, propitiation of various spirits, sacrifices of animals and even human beings were among the fundamentals of the Pönist Faith. Priests of the Black Pön were greatly dreaded throughout Tibet.

The Pönist religion prevailed in Tibet without a rival till Buddhism came first in the sixth century A.D. and gained strength in the seventh and eighth, its influence gradually pervading the life of the people. But the Buddhism which ultimately emerged was considerably influenced by Pön beliefs and practices. The mass of the people could not rid themselves of their faith in the old gods and goddesses. The Mahāyāna School with its superhuman beings, its rituals, and personal devotion had a mass appeal and so the Bodhisattvas were worshipped and faith in them was inculcated. Mythology grew up round the Buddha. It was soon accepted that other Buddhas had illuminated the world from time to time before Gautama came. Later on heavenly Buddhas were recognized. Five of them were pre-eminent, among whom the Buddha of Measureless Light is the best known. The other deities are the Lord of Mercy, who became in due course the patron-deity of Tibet, and, hardly less important, the goddesses who became objects of adoration and worship along with the male deities. Among the great

teachers and saints who were responsible for the development of these new ideas special mention should be made of Nagarjuna, Atisha, Marpa, and Milarepa. Monasteries sprung up all over the country, the most famous being the Potala of Lhasa, with the Dalai Lama as its head.

Part Two of the book contains a detailed account of the power of the priests, the method of their recruitment, their varied duties, both temporal and spiritual, and the manner in which the Dalai Lama is chosen and his immense powers.

Altogether the book is a veritable mine of information on all aspects of the religious life of the Tibetans, and will long remain a classic on the subject.

B. V. NARAYANA REDDY

The Message of the Tibetans. By ARNAUD DESJARDINS. Translated from the French by R. H. WARD and VEGA STEWART. (Stuart and Watkins, London. 132 pp. 1969. Illustrated. 35*s*. i.e. £1.75)

Delightfully written and translated, with a wealth of detail extraordinary in so small a volume, this book reveals the vital paradox of Buddhism, and indeed of all Truth, so vividly that only the author's skill in its presentation gives it any hope of appeal to modern scepticism.

His credentials are impeccable. He not only met the *élite* of the Tibetan sages gathered conveniently since 1959 in accessible parts of India and Sikkim, but he was permitted by the Dalai Lama, who made a great impression on him, to make a film designed to preserve the essence of a tradition threatened with extinction. The paradox to which he penetrates through fascinating interviews and reflections is summed up in the words of the mystic Khempo Kaloo:

> You live in illusion, and in the appearance of things. There is a Reality. You are the Reality. But you do not know it. If you wake up to that Reality, you will know that you are nothing and, being nothing, that you are everything. That's all!

In another work that I was privileged to read recently, *Light on the Path*, this same supreme paradox has been offered to us, this same key to a treasure beyond price. M. Desjardins gives us this chance again, provided we pay particular attention to what he says of himself.

He is a Christian, with the added advantage of a reverence for Hinduism. In a concluding letter to his friend and guide on his Indian journeyings, Sonam T. Kazi, he dedicates his book to his Hindu guru "Swamiji," and stresses the pupil's dependence on a Master.

Every seeker needs a Master, and we must follow our Master (whom we find always when we are honestly ready for him) without quibbling; for the way to the knowledge of our own nothingness is too dangerous for our ignorance. The Way leads inevitably to this death of the self, as Christ leads his true followers to the Cross. For it is only there, in that void beyond the illusions of this life, that the Voice of the Silence is heard and man is reborn into Reality — to know himself and his God.

D. S. MAXTED

Classical Sāṁkhya: An Interpretation of Its History and Meaning. By GERALD JAMES LARSON. (Motilal Banarsidas, Delhi. xii+312 pp. 1969. Rs. 30.00)

Of this book, which is substantially the author's dissertation accepted by the Columbia University for its PH.D. degree in 1967, the aim is to offer "an interpretation of the history and meaning of Classical Sāṁkhya." By "Classical Sāṁkhya" the author means "the formulation of Sāṁkhya found in Īśvarakṛṣṇa's *Sāṁkhyakārikā*" (p. 4); and he is right, for, though tradition attributes the founding of the school to a mythical Kapila, the aphorisms known in his name now are very late. Dating

from the fourteenth or fifteenth century A.D. these are later than the *Kārikās* of Īśvarakṛṣṇa by at least ten centuries. Yet the author cannot help feeling that "the Kārikā is a difficult text which presents the system in a rather dogmatic, condensed fashion" and would consider it natural to go to "other available texts for purposes of clarity" (p. 75).

The book is divided into three Chapters. Besides giving a "brief summary of the key doctrines of the *Sāṁkhya-kārikā*," Chapter I indulges also in a "critical review" of the interpretations of the Sāṁkhya school by earlier writers like Garbe, Dahlmann, Oltramare, Oldenberg, Keith, Edgerton, Dasgupta, Johnston, Frauwallner, van Buitenen, Hauer, and Eliade. Dr. Larson is aware (p. vii) that this review is long and would not burden his "Western audience" with it. He could have been equally considerate to his Indian and Asian audience and reduced this Chapter considerably. Nearly every University Library in India worth its name contains the works of most of these writers.

In Chapter II Dr. Larson traces the historical development of Classical Sāṁkhya from the Vedic pariod (*c.* 1200 B.C.) to the period of its "Renaissance" at the hands of Aniruddha (*c.* A.D. 1500) and Vijñānabhikṣu (*c.* A.D. 1600). In the Vedas and the oldest Upaniṣads, the author sees "many motifs, ideas and structures of thought" which are later "assimilated into Sāṁkhya contexts." In the later period of the law-books, epics, and some later Upaniṣads he discerns the "appearance of a definite Sāṁkhya-Yoga tradition." The period of Classical Sāṁkhya is, according to Dr. Larson, "from 1st cent. A.D. through about 10th cent. A.D."

Chapter III would show that

> Classical Samkhya is a system of religious thought which seeks to understand the world and man's place in the world from the perspective of this fact of consciousness. The world is not derived from consciousness, nor is consciousness derived from the world. Consciousness is not man's will or mind or self-awareness. It is rather the pure, translucent witness, which is at once the source of man's freedom and his suffering.

Dr. Larson feels (pp. 166ff.) that Sāṁkhya is neither the "philosophic naturalism" of Garbe or Dasgupta, nor the "decadent form of Vedānta" of Deussen or Radhakrishnan. He would see in it (pp. 229ff.) a similarity to the phenomenological ontology of Jean-Paul Sartre. There can be no hesitation in agreeing with him when he declares that "Sāṁkhya is dealing in a significant manner with some of the most difficult problems of religion and thought." It is refreshing indeed to read a book on Sāṁkhya untainted by bias, traditional or modern. The word *mokṣa* is rendered better as "liberation" than as "salvation" (p. 3). A few misprints (pp. 5, 258) need correction.

H. G. NARAHARI

Contemporary Philosophy in Australia. Edited by ROBERT BROWN and C. D. ROLLINS. (Muirhead Library of Philosophy. George Allen and Unwin Ltd., London; Humanities Press, New York. 216 pp. 1969. 48*s*., i.e. £2.40)

We talk of Greek Philosophy though it comprises schools of thought very different from one another. So we could equally well talk of Australian Philosophy. But there need be no quarrel with the actual title of this book on the ground that it plays for safety. In fact, contemporary Australian philosophy as represented here by essays coming from present or past Australian academics is largely similar to the logical-empiricist intellectualism that dominates contemporary English and American philosophy: it has nothing to do with the existentialist, grandiloquent speculation of contemporary Europe.

The essays are pertinaciously analytical, and abundant in ancillary neologisms. Even when not primarily concerned with philosophical logic — as in

the first five essays on "Russell and Bradley," "The Existence of Universals," "An Epistemological Concept of Truth," "Fact, Form and Intentionality," "A Causal Account of Inferring" — they luxuriate wherever they can in the employment of contemporary logical symbolism, as particularly in the essays "Two Arguments Against the Identity Thesis" and "The Passage of Time." For all its logical-positivist bias, the book includes essays on such metaphysical topics as the mind-brain relation, the status of colours, the nature of persons — metaphysical because beyond conclusive illumination by anything sensible, and so to be understood by the positivist pejoratively. There is much reference in the essay on "People" to Strawson, who, indeed, is also much referred to elsewhere. In the essay on "Mill's Third Howler" we even have a contribution to ethics, which even glances at the question "why anyone should be moral — i.e., should subordinate self-interest to the general happiness."

This book should be a source of rich stimulation to those who relish doing philosophy in the contemporary technical, esoteric manner, untroubled by the distresses of the market-place. It might delight them not least by what is reminiscent of traditional scepticism and its traditional refutation. Are we to say that it is true that truth is simply a degree of probability, and that probability is simply a degree of readiness for self-commitment to a proposition? In what sense of truth does the paper which seeks "to prepare the ground for the acceptance of a unified system of truth and probability logic of the kind envisaged by Reichenbach" say what is true?

M. KAYE

Religion in Africa. By GEOFFREY PARRINDER. (Penguin African Library. Penguin Books Ltd., Harmondsworth, Middlesex. 253 pp. 1969. 6*s*., i.e. 30*p*.)

Geoffrey Parrinder, who spent more than twenty years in this vast continent of 280,000,000 people, is here concerned with belief in spiritual things rather than with doctrinal comparisons, and concentrates on the living religions of Africa as a whole in the order of their appearance, namely: traditional religions (i.e., the older pre-literate religions), Christianity, and Islam.

Discoveries of African bronzes, carvings, etc., provide no real substitute for the entirely lacking scriptures and texts of pre-literate religions, nor should these religions be confused with superstitions. The whole of mankind is "incurably religious" in its quest for the meaning of life. Almost half the population of the continent follows pre-literate religions compared with 83,000,000 Muslims and 70,000,000 Christians.

Next we learn that Christianity entered Africa about A.D. 100. It has also had a continuous history in Egypt and Ethiopia; in the latter today about five million Christians practise circumcision.

The Bible is the greatest classic for many Africans — thanks to the scholarship of missionaries. But since most African languages are tonal, combinations with Moody and Sankey often clashed, producing at times gibberish. Polygamy, fear of witchcraft, and the separatist sects have been critical factors for the Churches in the past, but the author considers that the racial policies of South Africa and Rhodesia, and the persecution of Christian tribes in the Sudan, present far greater dangers for the future.

Islam has been dominant in North Africa for over thirteen hundred years and, although ritual prayers are in Arabic, the process of naturalization, as with Christianity, is being accomplished by the Africans themselves. The general tradition of tolerance and respect and the interactions of the different religions will undoubtedly prove helpful in the religious dialogue for tomorrow though Islam and Christianity have the enormous advantage of greatly superior organizations.

This is a scholarly and readable study, a reference book with a useful bibliography, but only one map — for instance, I know now that Mauretania became an Islamic Republic in 1960, but where is it?

ALFRED PARKER

Christians and the Church in the German Democratic Republic. (Verlag Zeit im Bild, Dresden. 39 pp. Illustrated. 2.75 Mark).

The position of the Church in the Communist state of East Germany (the German Democratic Republic) is unique in the Communist world. It is a situation where the Marxist intellectual system is in dialogue — and confrontation — with the Protestant system, emphasizing "word" rather than cult. The churches in the German Democratic Republic contribute to its welfare state by running hospitals and children's homes, and, for those Christians so willing, contribute also to the Government through the Christian Democratic Union. This new small book of forty pages, issued by the party, answers many questions about the role of the Church in the German Democratic Republic, ranging from facts about the relative strengths of Protestant, Roman Catholic, and Jewish communities, and the state's concern for the preservation and restoration of historic ecclesiastical edifices, to ecumenism and the distinctive contribution of Christians to the peace movement.

This document will not suddenly alter the minds of those who maintain — wrongly in my opinion (I have visited the country six times) — that religion is "persecuted" in Communist Germany. For those seeking an objective understanding of Christian-Marxist relations in an important Communist state, this documentation will be very useful, particularly, however, because it discusses briefly issues neglected before.

BRIAN G. COOPER

Socio-Economic Change and the Religious Factor in India: An Indian Symposium of Views on Max Weber. Edited by CHARLES P. LOOMIS and ZONA K. LOOMIS. (Affiliated East-West Press, New Delhi; Van Nostrand Reinhold Company, New York. 140 pp. 1969)

Under what conditions can India hope to become a modernized society and an industrialized nation? Are there elements in the Indian tradition, and particularly in the Hindu religion, that act as constraints on modernization and economic development? These and related questions have, since Independence, been of vital concern to planning and to policy in India and have provided the major challenge to the social sciences during the last decade.

Long before it became a matter of practical concern, however, Max Weber had been struck by the contrast between ascetic Hinduism and Protestantism as practised by the Puritans and the Calvinists. He hypothesized that the economic system of the capitalist industrialized West was a by-product of the Protestant ethic. What is more important is that he made his point by indicating Hinduism and the economic system of India as a study in contrast. Max Weber's hypothesis is important not merely because of an interest in the history of the development of thinking on modernization but because most subsequent thinkers on the issue have drawn heavily on Weber for their theorizing on modernization, change, and economic growth in the developing countries.

In 1966, a Seminar of Indian and Western scholars was held at the National Institute of Community Development, Hyderabad, to discuss the validity of Weber's thesis. In this volume, Charles and Zona Loomis, who had prepared the key paper summarizing Weber's hypothesis for the benefit of

the discussants at the seminar, present a detailed record of the discussion that ensued. The editors have used their familiar PAS model to organize the thinking of the Seminar. The volume is divided into eleven brief chapters to correspond to the eleven categories into which the social structure of particular social systems may be classified in the PAS model. The categories are: knowing; feeling; achieving; norming, standardizing or patterning; dividing functions and roles; ranking; controlling; sanctioning; facilitating; the master processes of communication, boundary maintenance, systematic linkage, social control, socialization, and institutionalization; and such conditions of social action as territoriality, time, and size. In each chapter the authors first present Weber's statement regarding differences between Hinduism and Protestantism as they enter into the factor under consideration and indicate Weber's position regarding the manner in which this difference makes for a difference in economic systems. This statement is followed by a list of the relevant (and irrelevant) comments made by the participants in the Seminar. The chapters conclude with the editors' own comments on the points made.

As a record, the presentation is systematic and lucid. But the volume is likely to disappoint those who are looking for a serious discussion on the Weberian hypothesis. This is not due to any shortcoming on the part of the editors. Rather, it seems to reflect the level of the discussion at the Seminar. The comments that are listed suggest that the Seminar was so completely bogged down by clarification of terms and of concepts used, by a questioning of the basic assumptions and of Weber's interpretation of Hinduism, and by a questioning of a Western scholar's "right" and "competence" to discuss the Hindu ethic, that it did not really get off to a discussion of more substantive issues. Yet those who are familiar with the way most seminars on modernization go are not likely to be surprised by the outcome of this one, and would find the Loomis volume useful, if not for the substantive content of the discussion, for the possible interpretations of the Weberian hypothesis that the discussion suggests and for the lucid presentation of the implications of Weber's statement.

SUMA CHITNIS

Freedom and Authority in Education: A Criticism of Modern Cultural and Educational Assumptions. By G. H. BANTOCK. (Faber and Faber Ltd., London. 212 pp. 1970. Paper-covered, 14*s*., i.e. £0.70)

The striving to preserve a balance between freedom and authority, and the assertion of one over against another as dynamic forces as well as static concepts, have been major aspects of the educational scene in the West for the past quarter-century. In very recent times, "student power" has asserted itself in higher educational establishments. Never was a discussion of "Freedom and Authority in Education," the theme of Professor G. H. Bantock's serious work, first published in 1952, now reissued in a second edition, more timely.

Bantock's rapier arguments pierce the intellectual inadequacy of so much contemporary British educational thinking, especially that of self-styled "progressives" who do a disservice to their very important ideas by failing to put them in a modern historical context. Living education demands a positive revision of tradition in every generation, not its nihilistic destruction. Attacking Mannheim's emphasis on educational institutions aiming to forge social unity, Bantock upholds the pursuit of excellence as a major educational ideal of continuing validity, though not necessarily in an elitist, antisocial way.

The author's positive examination of the proper limitations, as well as the

real contribution, of "free expression" and "group work" in education leads on to a positive commendation of Arnold, Newman, and Lawrence and their insights into "living culture" for education. The author recognizes Arnold's many inadequacies but urges the retention of his concern for "quality"; Newman's relating of all learning to the quest for the supreme truths of religion, though unfashionable in the West, seems to this reviewer an even more important concern which Western civilization is currently neglecting at its peril. The major limitations of Professor Bantock's book are his neglect of social purpose and his inadequate definition of how far education can promote social responsibility.

BRIAN G. COOPER

England in 1819: Church, State and Poverty. A study, textual and historical, of "A Ballad," by Shelley, formerly entitled "Young Parson Richards," including hitherto unpublished MS. material. By WILLIAM J. MCTAGGART. Keats-Shelley Memorial Association, London. 36 pp. 1970. £1.00; $2.50)

All his life, Shelley denounced tyranny and oppression, advocating liberty, justice, and universal love. The theme comes out idealistically in his greatest poems and in a practical way in prose pamphlets and in verses addressed directly to the people. Most of these last, for their "subversive" views, were suppressed during his lifetime. One of them, left unpublished for 108 years, is the intended broadsheet called "A Ballad" that Mr. McTaggart studies here. He has given it academic treatment, collating two versions in Shelley's hand in order to evolve his own reading of the text.

That useful scholarly chore is for the experts. The general reader will be more closely held by the historical survey considered in Part II, which places these small journalistic verses in a surprisingly vast political and sociological field. At a glance, the story is sheer sob-stuff. An exhausted woman, nursing her dying infant, pleads in vain to the sleek young parson for the food and covering denied to the starving masses. Failing any response she collapses and dies, while the parson sees on the face of the stiff, cold child, his own inherited features.

Melodramatic — but Shelley meant the symbolism to be clear. At that time the agricultural no less than the industrial revolution had brought great hardship through maladministration. The massacres and failure of France's revolution had stiffened England's Church and State against the populace who had no official body to voice their sufferings. Shelley took up their cause with such eloquent warnings as his "Mask of Anarchy" and other revolutionary pieces that stressed the crying need for reform. With these the little "Ballad" has its place, both in sociological history and in the study of Shelley's own attitude and beliefs.

Reviewing all these aspects, Mr. McTaggart has done a brilliant piece of amplification by exploring every outward path from his small centre. Concentrated and significant, his brief pamphlet is a lesson to the diffuse thesis-writers.

SYLVA NORMAN

Stotrasamuccaya: A Collection of Rare and Unpublished Stotras. Vol. II. Edited by K. PARAMESWARA AITHAL. (The Adyar Library and Research Centre, Madras. 386 pp. 1969)

This is a companion volume to the first collection of *Stotras* under the same title, reviewed in THE ARYAN PATH, February 1970. To the fifty devotional hymns contained in the first are added fifty more in this second part. While the first thirty are in praise of Lord Viṣṇu, eight are addressed to his consort Lakṣmī, and the rest are devoted to the glorification of different Hindu deities.

Most of these authors belong to "the period of decadence" in Sanskrit poetry. Sanskrit poetry ceased to grow after the age of the Ācāryas and the later poets were concerned more with imitation than with expression of original thought. All the authors represented here are later than the sixteenth century. They are religious souls in good faith, but poets only by circumstance.

There are representative writers from each of the three major Vedānta Schools, namely Advaita, Viśiṣṭādvaita, and Dvaita. All of them share a common heritage of Purāṇic mythology and sure mastery over the technique of versification. They mostly struggle to achieve alliterative and rhythmic effects without sacrificing the genuineness of their prayerful attitude.

The devotional hymns are very uneven in the metrical patterns, and in length, ranging from six to three hundred and one verses. There are a few like the "*Viraktimuktāvali*" which are full of personal feeling and breathe the spirit of renunciation.

The volume represents a passing era in Indian culture with prayer as the centre of religious life. The authors show a conviction about the efficacy of prayer in securing divine grace and getting over worldly woes. Students of Hindu religion have to be grateful to the Adyar Library for thus making available, for the first time, in handsome volumes, the work of religious poets from South India. Incidentally, we get an idea of the deities of the famous shrines in the South which draw crowds of pilgrims even today. The experienced editor has spared no pains to make the edition useful by providing indexes of authors and *stotras* besides a critical Introduction.

K. KRISHNAMOORTHY

Ends and Sayings

" . . . ends of verse
And sayings of philosophers."

—SAMUEL BUTLER: *Hudibras*

The Architectural Review is presenting a series of special issures "MAN-PLAN," of which No. 5 (March 1970) is devoted to religion's influence on architecture and environment. Though, naturally, it does not go into questions of belief, its bird's-eye view of the basic factors of a religious outlook, the latter's potential influence on the environment and the type of architecture engendered, make this survey, within its limits, most stimulating. Numerous excellent photographs afford examples and give emphasis to the points made.

A non-religious environment rests on "a rational plan into which human beings have to fit, totally ordered on material considerations alone," but modern society cannot really be called "religionless." The extension of knowledge has not diminished mystery. Further, "the social objectives on which we are most firmly set — the achievement of unity, the defence of the weak, even the defence of human freedom and dignity — all derive from a religious orientation." Technology has unsettled man and changed his ways of living, but not his objectives.

Lance Wright diagnoses three common factors in all religions (the photographs show similar attitudes of reverence in different world faiths) — a deep-seated belief in meaningful human action that gives life a kind of dignity; a recognition of the value of the human being as a person; and finally, a sense of duration, "a vast time perspective

... as in the mirror of eternity." He shows how religious ideas remain, even when formal belief has gone and social compulsions no longer demand attendance and lip-service. The present "sympathetic contact" between religions has great cultural potentialities. The respective religions are no longer conflicting "closed systems," with distinct fossilized cultural patterns. And, since none now looks upon itself as the sole repository of truth, but rather as containing a core of truth, demanding constant expansion and complementation, this change of attitude, Mr. Wright believes, may "restore religion to its natural position as unifier of human society." Perhaps one may not quite share his optimism as regards ecumenism providing in itself the operative factors for unity, though it prepares the ground. Religion is not a syncretic union, a putting together from without within. The universal symbol of the tree of life — one root yet many branches — is, rather, its true image, and, to find unity we must realize that root. Yet, we can hope with Mr. Wright that the spirit in man ("the religious side to man's nature") is about to assert itself, making "a profound change in the use of technology, a change in the direction in which progress is sought."

Our social architecture and environments, in all their dehumanizing concentrations of power and mass production, are indications of the false values that negate the fulfilment of human aspirations, especially for the younger, more imaginatively-trained newer generation. Religious architecture is pointing the way. The new churches, more in scale with human beings, are small, built for, and by, local interests. There is an extension and sharing of activities, and often a sharing of a church between sects. The photographs shown of new buildings are those of Christian churches, since Christians have been most affected by a technological environment and thus have reacted first to the newer influence. The keynote for the right use of the tools of technology and of communication should be set by religion:

> ... a new concept of society ... animated by love, accepting differences, insistent on freedom and anxious that decision-making should be as far as possible with individuals.

A new journal, *Studies in the History and Philosophy of Science,* is promised in May 1970, from Macmillan (Journals) Ltd., London. International in character, with a consultant editorial board drawn from four continents, it aims to approach science in its context of the wider world, as also at the deeper philosophical levels. Its contents and their presentation, therefore, will avoid

> the artificial academic divisions which have traditionally hindered a unified approach to the development of the scientific enterprise.

Professor C. H. Waddington's book *Behind Appearance,* reviewed by John Davy (*The Observer,* 1 March 1970), is about the influence upon artists of scientific research into the nature of the physical world. John Davy concludes thus:

> It is unusual for Professors of Animal Genetics to write books about art. It is unprecedented, so far as I know, for anyone to survey the frontiers of science and painting in one breath, with such lucidity and verve ... two apparently different worlds ... turn out to overlap in some unexpected ways. I think it will prompt many other people, experts and laymen alike, to set out on similar explorations with a sharpened perception of their surroundings.

It may well be that the dominant note to which present trends are being gradually tuned is that of synthesis, in contradistinction to the analytical spirit that has been the driving force in the search for knowledge, during the past centuries of the scientific era. The changing scholastic attitudes and curriculums, the more co-ordinated organizing of university departments, the reaction against the over-specialization still prevalent in some quarters, the student revolt, however distorted, against isolation from world concerns

and responsibilities, the innumerable experiments in the arts, combining various fields — all seem to indicate a change in polarity.

One might examine, in this context, the ancient Indian classification of the human constitution. The principle of *manas* or mind, with its analytical, reasoning, planning power, has to be united with the yet higher principle of *buddhi*, i.e., with the intuitional, synthesizing power of spiritual discernment. Then the single vision of the heart (the true heart) pierces through the pictures in the mind's eye to unity. Intellect alone is without depth, cannot reconcile the opposites, cannot ultimately satisfy.

Yet there is a dark shadow to this potential illumination. Buddhi may be called non-rational, in that it is *above* reason. Yet too many people, rebelling against a reason that has become too rigidly imprisoning, become slaves to the irrationality that is *below* reason, the disruptive, disintegrating irrationality associated with the uncontrolled passion, violence, and desire of the lower principle of *kama*. That is the all too obvious danger today, and every sign of an integrating synthesizing approach to knowledge must be welcome.

Richard Boston's report of Buckminster Fuller's lecture at London, March 1970 (*New Society*, 12 March 1970) is in a somewhat jocular vein, but brings out, nevertheless, some of the significance of the lecturer's revolutionary approach to architecture — he is the inventor of the geodesic dome and the Dymaxion House — as well as his imaginative and lively originality.

Originality means a going back to origins, to fundamental principles — in this case, of the spatial geometry underlying architecture, and the dynamics of motion. Further, this little old man of seventy-four, by some process of imaginative self-identification, a kind of magic mime, *became* the facts and ideas he poured out upon the audience — the orbits of a gyroscope, the hurling of an imaginary hammer by a husky athlete, the tense pulling of an imaginary rope, the building of a "solid" honeycomb from invisible steel rods by a giant, and so on.

He opened up new vistas on such concepts as "precession" and "synergy" (understood by Richard Boston to be "the ability of a whole to behave in a way that could not be predicted from any prior knowledge of the individual parts"). In his explanation of the physical world and the proposed solution for its salvation, it was, Richard Boston writes, "the most breath-taking sermon I have ever heard."

In "Imagination and the Future" (*Unesco Chronicle*, February 1970), Robert Jungk writes:

> It is now recognized that the future begins in the mind. ... it is questionable whether sufficient importance is being given to creative imagination. Intuition, visions and extravagant ideas must not be ruled out in science; they have, in the past, sparked off real "break-throughs" which have resulted in much more far-reaching practical changes than those obtained through research aimed from the start at practical applications.

This is the climate of "Renaissance." What will the mind of man bring forth?

THE THEOSOPHICAL MOVEMENT

"Our voice is raised for spiritual freedom, and our plea made for enfranchisement from all tyranny, whether of *Science* or *Theology*."
—H. P. Blavatsky

40-PAGE MONTHLY
Rates per annum:
Rs. 7, 14s., or
$3-50 (Post free)
SAMPLE COPY FREE

The December Issue Includes:—

WHERE SHALL WE GO FOR HELP?

YOGA VIDYA—I

DROP BY DROP

RELATION OF OCCULT SCIENCE TO MODERN SCIENCE

FEEDING THE MIND

FOR EVER FRESH, THOSE VERNAL BLOOMS!—LETTER 2

A NEW-YEAR MESSAGE

THEOSOPHY COMPANY (INDIA) PRIVATE LTD.
40 NEW MARINE LINES, BOMBAY 20 (BR), INDIA

THE ARYAN PATH

THE ARYAN PATH seeks to light up the Way: it believes there is one for all souls. But it preaches no fixed creed. Sincere and coherent statements of many points of view find place in it, so long as they touch on the great human concerns. The journal seeks to promote, among thoughtful men who are not necessarily specialists or scholars, study and comparison of ideas ancient and modern, Eastern and Western; and of perspectives mystical, philosophical, literary, and social-reformist.

In this way it hopes to draw on the treasuries of learned, thoughtful, gracious minds for the general use and to induce in each reader an alert perception of his own simultaneously with respect for many others. The typical, wished-for reader of THE ARYAN PATH is interested in the things of the mind and in the products of other cultures as well as those of his own.

THE ARYAN PATH has always been maintained by heavy sacrifices, charity funds at the disposal of the promoters having been used to support it as a public service. It has seen forty years of continuous publication.

A subscriber receives in the course of each year 500 Royal Octavo pages or more of substantial writing, for an annual subscription of Rs. 12.00, 18*s*., or $5.00. This barely covers the cost of producing and forwarding the physical copies: the authors' fees and the expenses of the offices are still a net burden. A wider circulation will ease this burden a little, on the one hand, and, on the other, fulfil the journal's hopes and aims. It is hoped that you will become a subscriber and bring THE ARYAN PATH to the notice of such friends as will share its high concerns.

Edited by Sophia Wadia at Theosophy Hall, 40 New Marine Lines, Bombay 20 (BR). Printed and published by P. Rangarajan at W. Q. Judge Press, 97 Residency Road, Bangalore-25.
Simultaneously published by K. R. Achutha Rao at Theosophy Hall, 40 New Marine Lines, Bombay 20 (BR)